-
作者：Brav, Alon; Mathews, Richmond D.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：We model corporate voting outcomes when an informed trader, such as a hedge fund, can establish separate positions in a firm's shares and votes (empty voting). The positions are separated by borrowing shares on the record date, hedging economic exposure, or trading between record and voting dates. We find that the trader's presence can improve efficiency overall despite the fact that it sometimes ends up selling to a net short position and then voting to decrease firm value. An efficiency impr...
-
作者：Boucly, Quentin; Sraer, David; Thesmar, David
作者单位：Princeton University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：Using a data set of 839 French deals, we look at the change in corporate behavior following a leveraged buyout (LBO) relative to an adequately chosen control group. In the 3 years following a leveraged buyout, targets become more profitable, grow much faster than their peer group, issue additional debt, and increase capital expenditures. We then provide evidence consistent with the idea that in our sample, private equity funds create value by relaxing credit constraints, allowing LBO targets t...
-
作者：Fecht, Falko; Nyborg, Kjell G.; Rocholl, Joerg
作者单位：Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of Zurich
摘要：We study the prices that individual banks pay for liquidity (captured by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap) as a function of market conditions and bank characteristics. These prices depend in particular on the distribution of liquidity across banks, which is calculated over time using individual bank-level data on reserve requirements and actual holdings. Banks pay more for liquidity when positions are more imbalanced across banks, consi...
-
作者：Kim, E. Han; Lu, Yao
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University
摘要：This paper shows the relation between CEO ownership and firm valuation hinges critically on the strength of external governance (EG). The relation is hump-shaped when EG is weak, but is insignificant when EG is strong. The results imply that CEO ownership and EG are substitutes for mitigating agency problems when ownership is low. However, very high levels of share ownership can reduce firm value by entrenching the CEO and discouraging him from taking risk, unless mitigated by strong EG. We id...
-
作者：Lin, Chen; Ma, Yue; Xuan, Yuhai
作者单位：Harvard University; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Lingnan University
摘要：This article examines the impact of the divergence between corporate insiders' control rights and cash-flow rights on firms' external finance constraints via generalized method of moments estimation of an investment Euler equation. Using a large sample of U.S. firms during the 1994-2002 period, we find that the shadow value of external funds is significantly higher for companies with a wider insider control-ownership divergence, suggesting that companies whose corporate insiders have larger ex...
-
作者：Ivashina, Victoria; Sun, Zheng
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：Between 2001 and 2007, annual institutional funding in highly leveraged loans went up from $32 billion to $426 billion, accounting for nearly 70% of the jump in total syndicated loan issuance over the same period. Did the inflow of institutional funding in the syndicated loan market lead to mispricing of credit? To understand this relation, we look at the institutional demand pressure defined as the number of days a loan remains in syndication. Using market-level and cross-sectional variation ...
-
作者：Price, Richard; Roman, Francisco J.; Rountree, Brian
作者单位：Rice University; Texas Tech University System; Texas Tech University
摘要：This study examines the influence of Mexico's efforts to improve corporate governance on firm performance and transparency. We utilize compliance data from the Code of 'Best' Corporate Practices, disclosed annually by public firms in Mexico, as a measure of corporate governance strength. We document a significant increase in compliance over 2000-2004 indicating Mexican companies view non-compliance as costly. However, we find no association between the governance index and firm performance, no...
-
作者：Kapadia, Nishad
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：This paper shows that exposure to aggregate distress risk is the underlying source of the premiums for the Fama-French size (SMB) and value (HML) factors. Using a unique data set of aggregate business failures of both private and public firms from 1926 to 1997, I build portfolios that track news about future firm failures. These tracking portfolios optimally hedge aggregate distress risk and earn a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) alpha of approximately -4% a year. Both HML and SMB predict c...
-
作者：Liu, Yixin; Mauer, David C.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University System Of New Hampshire; University of New Hampshire
摘要：We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests could influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and cash holdings, and we find a negative relation between vega and the value of cash to shareholders. The negative effect of vega...
-
作者：Faleye, Olubunmi; Hoitash, Rani; Hoitash, Udi
作者单位：Northeastern University; Bentley University
摘要：We study the effects of the intensity of board monitoring on directors' effectiveness in performing their monitoring and advising duties. We find that monitoring quality improves when a majority of independent directors serve on at least two of the three principal monitoring committees. These firms exhibit greater sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance, lower excess executive compensation, and reduced earnings management. The improvement in monitoring quality comes at the significant ...
