Ownership structure and financial constraints: Evidence from a structural estimation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lin, Chen; Ma, Yue; Xuan, Yuhai
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Lingnan University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.06.001
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 416-431
• 关键词: ownership structure; Insider excess control rights; financial constraints

摘要

This article examines the impact of the divergence between corporate insiders' control rights and cash-flow rights on firms' external finance constraints via generalized method of moments estimation of an investment Euler equation. Using a large sample of U.S. firms during the 1994-2002 period, we find that the shadow value of external funds is significantly higher for companies with a wider insider control-ownership divergence, suggesting that companies whose corporate insiders have larger excess control rights are more financially constrained. The effect of insider excess control rights on external finance constraints is more pronounced for firms with higher degrees of informational opacity and for firms with financial misreporting, and is moderated by institutional ownership. The results show that the agency problems associated with the control-ownership divergence can have a real impact on corporate financial and investment outcomes. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.