2期

最新文章

• Litigation risk, strategic disclosure and the underpricing of initial public offerings AI翻译
  作者：Hanley, Kathleen Weiss; Hoberg, Gerard
  作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC)
  摘要：Using word content analysis on the time-series of IPO prospectuses, we show that issuers tradeoff underpricing and strategic disclosure as potential hedges against litigation risk. This tradeoff explains a significant fraction of the variation in prospectus revision patterns, IPO underpricing, the partial adjustment phenomenon, and litigation outcomes. We find that strong disclosure is an effective hedge against all types of lawsuits. Underpricing, however, is an effective hedge only against S...
• The short of it: Investor sentiment and anomalies AI翻译
  作者：Stambaugh, Robert F.; Yu, Jianfeng; Yuan, Yu
  作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research
  摘要：This study explores the role of investor sentiment in a broad set of anomalies in cross-sectional stock returns. We consider a setting in which the presence of market-wide sentiment is combined with the argument that overpricing should be more prevalent than underpricing, due to short-sale impediments. Long-short strategies that exploit the anomalies exhibit profits consistent with this setting. First, each anomaly is stronger (its long-short strategy is more profitable) following high levels ...
• Disclosure and agency conflict: Evidence from mutual fund commission bundling AI翻译
  作者：Edelen, Roger M.; Evans, Richard B.; Kadlec, Gregory B.
  作者单位：University of Virginia; University of California System; University of California Davis; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
  摘要：This study provides empirical evidence on the role of disclosure in resolving agency conflicts in delegated investment management. For certain expenditures, fund managers have alternative means of payment which differ greatly in their opacity: payments can be expensed (relatively transparent): or bundled with brokerage commissions (relatively opaque). We find that the return impact of opaque payments is significantly more negative than that of transparent payments. Moreover, we find a differen...