Disclosure and agency conflict: Evidence from mutual fund commission bundling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Edelen, Roger M.; Evans, Richard B.; Kadlec, Gregory B.
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; University of California System; University of California Davis; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.09.007
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 308-326
• 关键词: Agency conflict; Mutual fund; performance; Brokerage commissions; expenses

摘要

This study provides empirical evidence on the role of disclosure in resolving agency conflicts in delegated investment management. For certain expenditures, fund managers have alternative means of payment which differ greatly in their opacity: payments can be expensed (relatively transparent): or bundled with brokerage commissions (relatively opaque). We find that the return impact of opaque payments is significantly more negative than that of transparent payments. Moreover, we find a differential flow reaction that confirms the opacity of commission bundling. Collectively, our results demonstrate the importance of transparency in addressing agency costs of delegated investment management. (C) 2011 Elsevier By. All rights reserved.