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作者：Hoechle, Daniel; Schmid, Markus; Walter, Ingo; Yermack, David
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Basel; New York University
摘要：We investigate whether the diversification discount occurs partly as an artifact of poor corporate governance. In panel data models, we find that the discount narrows by 16% to 21% when we add governance variables as regression controls. We also estimate Heckman selection models that account for the endogeneity of diversification and dynamic panel generalized method of moments models that account for the endogeneity of both diversification and governance. We find that the diversification disco...
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作者：Schultz, Paul
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：I examine how transparency and interdealer trading affects prices investors pay in municipal bond offerings. Real-time trade reporting for municipal bonds started January 31, 2005. The dispersion of purchase prices fell sharply at that time. There was little impact on average markups for most trades, but they increased for purchases of more than $100,000. Bonds often pass through a series of dealers before being placed with a buy-and-hold investor. As the interdealer trades progress, trade siz...
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作者：Stambaugh, Robert F.; Yu, Jianfeng; Yuan, Yu
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This study explores the role of investor sentiment in a broad set of anomalies in cross-sectional stock returns. We consider a setting in which the presence of market-wide sentiment is combined with the argument that overpricing should be more prevalent than underpricing, due to short-sale impediments. Long-short strategies that exploit the anomalies exhibit profits consistent with this setting. First, each anomaly is stronger (its long-short strategy is more profitable) following high levels ...
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作者：Cassell, Cory A.; Huang, Shawn X.; Sanchez, Juan Manuel; Stuart, Michael D.
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
摘要：CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm. Because these characteristics of inside debt expose the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors, theory predicts that CEOs with large inside debt holdings will display lower levels of risk-seeking behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings...
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作者：Edelen, Roger M.; Evans, Richard B.; Kadlec, Gregory B.
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of California System; University of California Davis; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：This study provides empirical evidence on the role of disclosure in resolving agency conflicts in delegated investment management. For certain expenditures, fund managers have alternative means of payment which differ greatly in their opacity: payments can be expensed (relatively transparent): or bundled with brokerage commissions (relatively opaque). We find that the return impact of opaque payments is significantly more negative than that of transparent payments. Moreover, we find a differen...
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作者：Alti, Aydogan; Sulaeman, Johan
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Southern Methodist University
摘要：One of the most prominent stylized facts in corporate finance is that equity issues tend to follow periods of high stock returns. We document that firms exhibit such timing behavior only in response to high returns that coincide with strong institutional investor demand. When not accompanied by institutional purchases, stock price increases have little impact on the likelihood of equity issuance. The results highlight the importance of market reception for the timing of equity issues. (C) 2011...
