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作者：Chen, Huaizhi; Cohen, Lauren; Gurun, Umit; Lou, Dong; Malloy, Christopher
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Using a novel database that tracks web traffic on the Security Exchange Commission's EDGAR server between 2004 and 2015, we show that institutional investors gather information on a very particular subset of firms and insiders, and their surveillance is very persistent over time. This tracking behavior has powerful implications for their portfolio choice and its information content. An institution that downloaded an insider trading filing by a given firm last quarter increases its likelihood o...
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作者：Crego, Julio A.
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：The arrival of a public signal worsens the adverse selection problem if informed investors are risk averse. Precisely, the public signal reduces uncertainty which boosts informed investors' participation leading to a more toxic order flow. I confirm the model's empirical predictions by estimating the effect of the publication of the weekly change in oil inventories on liquidity via a difference-in-differences strategy. The bid-ask spread of stocks related to oil doubles after the release and t...
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作者：Nanda, Ramana; Samila, Sampsa; Sorenson, Olav
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Yale University
摘要：We use investment-level data to study performance persistence in venture capital (VC). Consistent with prior studies, we find that each additional initial public offering (IPO) among a VC firm's first ten investments predicts as much as an 8% higher IPO rate on its subsequent investments, though this effect erodes with time. In exploring its sources, we document several additional facts: successful outcomes stem in large part from investing in the right places at the right times; VC firms do n...
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作者：Koudijs, Peter; Salisbury, Laura
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; York University - Canada
摘要：We study the impact of marital property legislation passed in the US South in the 1840s on households' investment in risky, entrepreneurial projects. These laws protected the assets of newly married women from creditors in a world of virtually unlimited liability. We compare couples married after the passage of a marital property law with couples from the same state who were married before. Consistent with a simple model of household borrowing that trades off agency costs against risk sharing,...
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作者：Frenkel, Sivan; Guttman, Ilan; Kremer, Ilan
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; New York University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Warwick
摘要：We analyze a model in which information may be voluntarily disclosed by a firm and/or by a third party, e.g., financial analysts. Due to its strategic nature, corporate voluntary disclosure is qualitatively different from third-party disclosure. Greater analyst coverage crowds out (crowds in) corporate voluntary disclosure when analysts mostly discover information that is available (unavailable) to the firm. Nevertheless, greater analyst coverage always improves the overall quality of public i...
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作者：Cenedese, Gino; Ranaldo, Angelo; Vasios, Michalis
作者单位：University of St Gallen; Bank of England
摘要：Using unique data at transaction and identity levels, we provide the first systematic study of interest rate swaps traded over the counter (OTC). We find substantial and persistent heterogeneity in derivative prices consistent with a pass-through of regulatory costs on to market prices via so-called valuation adjustments (XVA). A client pays a higher price to buy interest rate protection from a dealer (i.e., the client pays a higher fixed rate) if the contract is not cleared via a central coun...
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作者：Fedaseyeu, Viktar
作者单位：China Europe International Business School
摘要：This paper finds that stricter laws regulating third-party debt collection reduce the number of third-party debt collectors, lower the recovery rates on delinquent credit card loans, and lead to a modest decrease in the openings of new revolving lines of credit. Further, stricter third-party debt collection laws are associated with fewer consumer lawsuits against third-party debt collectors but not with a reduction in the overall number of consumer complaints. Overall, stricter third-party deb...
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作者：Lang, Mark; Maffett, Mark; Omartian, James D.; Silvers, Roger
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of Chicago; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：We investigate the effect of cross-border regulatory cooperation in the enforcement of securities laws on global-mutual-fund portfolio allocations. Our research design exploits a shock to the Securities and Exchange Commission's oversight of foreign firms cross-listed on a US stock exchange around the signing of the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU), a non-binding, information-sharing arrangement between global securities regulators. In signatory countries, foreign investment in ...
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作者：Gilje, Erik P.; Gormley, Todd A.; Levit, Doron
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We derive a measure that captures the extent to which common ownership shifts managers' incentives to internalize externalities. A key feature of the measure is that it allows for the possibility that not all investors are attentive to whether a manager's actions benefit the investor's overall portfolio. Empirically, we show that potential drivers of common ownership, including mergers in the asset management industry and, under certain circumstances, even indexing, could diminish managerial m...
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作者：Feldman, David; Saxena, Konark; Xu, Jingrui
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：We introduce a theoretical model of the active fund management industry (AFMI) in which performance and size depend on the AFMI's competitiveness (concentration). Under plausible assumptions, as AFMI's concentration decreases, so do fund managers' incentives for exerting effort in search of alpha. Consequently, managers produce lower gross alpha, and rational investors, inferring lower expected AFMI performance, allocate a smaller portion of their wealth to active funds. Empirically, we find t...
