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作者：Greenwood, Robin
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：I examine a series of stock splits in Japan in which firms restrict the ability of their investors to sell their shares for a period of approximately 2 months. By removing potential sellers from the market, the restrictions have the effect of increasing the impact of trading on prices. The greater the desire of investors to trade, and the greater the restrictions, the larger the impact of the restrictions. In the data, particularly severe restrictions are associated with returns of over 30% ar...
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作者：Barber, Brad M.; Lee, Yi-Tsung; Liu, Yu-Jane; Odean, Terrance
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Chengchi University; Peking University
摘要：Individual investor trading results in systematic and economically large losses. Using a complete trading history of all investors in Taiwan, we document that the aggregate portfolio of individuals suffers an annual performance penalty of 3.8 percentage points. Individual investor losses are equivalent to 2.2% of Taiwan's gross domestic product or 2.8% of the total personal income. Virtually all individual trading losses can be traced to their aggressive orders. In contrast, institutions enjoy...
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作者：Bebchuk, Lucian; Cohen, Alma; Ferrell, Allen
作者单位：Harvard University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We investigate the relative importance of the twenty-four provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and included in the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick governance index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003). We put forward an entrenchment index based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. We find that increases in the index level are...
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作者：Comer, George; Larrymore, Norris; Rodriguez, Javier
作者单位：Georgetown University; Quinnipiac University; University of Puerto Rico
摘要：We examine whether explicitly controlling for the fixed-income exposure of mutual funds affects conclusions drawn in performance assessment. We focus on daily return data from two hybrid mutual fund samples. Comparing abnormal performance estimates from the Carhart (1997) model to extensions designed to correct for bond holdings, we find that the estimates within one of our samples change from positive to significantly negative. Additional evidence indicates that cash flows to the funds are mo...
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作者：Hege, Ulrich; Lovo, Stefano; Slovin, Myron B.; Sushka, Marie E.
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We develop a two-sided asymmetric information model of asset sales that incorporates the key differences from mergers and allows the information held by each party to be impounded in the transaction. The buyer's information is conveyed through a first-stage competitive auction. A seller with unfavorable information about the asset accepts the cash offer of the highest bidder. A seller with favorable information proposes a take-it-or-leave-it counteroffer that entails buyer equity. Thus, the ca...
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作者：Bouwman, Christa H. S.; Fuller, Kathleen; Nain, Amrita S.
作者单位：McGill University; University of Mississippi; University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University
摘要：Existing research shows that significantly more acquisitions occur when stock markets are booming than when markets are depressed. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) hypothesize that firm-specific and market-wide valuations lead to an excess of mergers, and these will be value destroying. This article investigates whether acquisitions occurring during booming markets are fundamentally different from those occurring during depressed markets. We find that acquirers buying during high-valuation ...
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作者：Yan, Xuemin (Sterling); Zhang, Zhe
作者单位：Singapore Management University; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
摘要：We show that the positive relation between institutional ownership and future stock returns documented in Gompers and Metrick (2001) is driven by short-term institutions. Furthermore, short-term institutions trading forecasts future stock returns. This predictability does not reverse in the long run and is stronger for small and growth stocks. Short-term institutions trading is also positively related to future earnings surprises. By contrast, long-term institutions trading does not forecast f...
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作者：Baranchuk, Nina; Dybvig, Philip H.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Many directors are not simply insiders or outsiders. For example, an officer of a supplier is neither independent nor captive of management. We use a spatial model of board decision-making to analyze bargaining among multiple types of directors. Board decisions are modeled using a new solution concept called consensus. We use consensus to show that the information a new director brings is more important than the new director's impact on bargaining when the board is large and not too diverse. O...
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作者：Brophy, David J.; Ouimet, Paige P.; Sialm, Clemens
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Hedge funds have become important investors in public companies raising equity privately. Hedge funds tend to finance companies that have poor fundamentals and pronounced information asymmetries. To compensate for these shortcomings, hedge funds protect themselves by requiring substantial discounts, negotiating repricing rights, and entering into short positions of the underlying stocks. We find that companies that obtain financing from hedge funds significantly underperform companies that obt...
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作者：Wang, Cong; Xie, Fei
作者单位：George Mason University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We present evidence on the benefits of changes in control from mergers and acquisitions. We find that the stronger the acquirer's shareholder rights relative to the target's, the higher the synergy created by an acquisition. This result supports the hypothesis that acquisitions of firms with poor corporate governance by firms with good corporate governance generate higher total gains. We also find that the synergy effect of corporate governance is shared by target shareholders and acquiring sh...
