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作者：Spiegel, Matthew
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作者：Adams, John C.; Mansi, Sattar A.; Nishikawa, Takeshi
作者单位：St. John's University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; State University System of Florida; University of North Florida
摘要：We provide new evidence linking board characteristics and performance. Using manually collected governance data from the mutual fund industry, we find an inverse relation between board size and fund performance. We also find evidence that organizational form plays an important role in determining operational performance. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that there may not be a single optimal board structure that is applicable to all funds, that attempts to regulate board att...
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作者：Schenone, Carola
作者单位：University of Virginia
摘要：In the process of lending to a firm, a bank acquires proprietary firm-specific information that is unavailable to nonlenders. This asymmetric evolution of information between lenders and prospective lenders grants the former an information monopoly. This article empirically investigates whether relationship banks exploit this advantage by charging higher interest rates than those that would prevail were all banks symmetrically informed. My identification strategy hinges on the notion that larg...
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作者：Shivdasani, Anil; Stefanescu, Irina
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：This article examines the capital structure implications of defined benefit corporate pension plans. The magnitude of the liabilities arising from these pension plans is substantial. We show that leverage ratios for firms with pension plans are about 35% higher when pension assets and liabilities are incorporated into the capital structure. We estimate that the tax shields from pension contributions are about a third of those from interest payments. Pension contributions have a modest effect i...
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作者：Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Neeman, Zvika
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We model how three groups-insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors, and entrepreneurs planning to take firms public-compete for influence over politicians setting the level of investor protection. We identify factors that push toward suboptimal investor protection, including corporate insiders' ability to use public firms' assets to influence politicians, and institutional investors' inability to capture fully the value of investor protection for outside investors. Entrep...
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作者：Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Weisbach, Michael S.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This article, which introduces the special issue on corporate governance cosponsored by the Review of Financial Studies and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), reviews and comments on the state of corporate governance research. The special issue features seven articles on corporate governance that were presented in a meeting of the NBER's corporate governance project. Each of the articles represents state-of-the-art research in an important area of corporate governance research. F...
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作者：Ravina, Enrichetta; Sapienza, Paola
作者单位：Columbia University; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We compare the trading performance of independent directors and other executives. The findings reveal that independent directors earn positive substantial abnormal returns when they purchase their company stock, and that the difference from the same firm's executives is relatively small at most horizons. We also find that executives and independent directors make higher returns in firms with the weakest governance, the gap between these two widens in such firms, and that independent directors ...
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作者：Becht, Marco; Franks, Julian; Mayer, Colin; Rossi, Stefano
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Oxford; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London Business School; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This article reports a unique analysis of private engagements by an activist fund. It is based on data made available to us by Hermes, the fund manager owned by the British Telecom Pension Scheme, on engagements with management in companies targeted by its UK Focus Fund. In contrast with most previous studies of activism, we report that the fund executes shareholder activism predominantly through private interventions that would be unobservable in studies purely relying on public information. ...
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作者：Chava, Sudheer; Kumar, Praveen; Warga, Arthur
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
摘要：Based on an analysis of the agency risk for bondholders from managerial entrenchment and fraud, we derive and test refutable hypotheses about the influence of managerial agency risk on bond covenants, using a comprehensive database of corporate bonds from the 1993-2007 period. Managerial entrenchment and the risk of managerial fraud significantly influence the use of covenants, in the direction predicted by the agency-theoretic framework. Our analysis highlights the varied effects of entrenchm...
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作者：Aggarwal, Reena; Erel, Isil; Stulz, Rene; Williamson, Rohan
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Georgetown University
摘要：We construct a firm-level governance index that increases with minority shareholder protection. Compared with U.S. matching firms, only 12.68% of foreign firms have a higher index. The value of foreign firms falls as their index decreases relative to the index of matching U.S. firms. Our results suggest that lower country-level investor protection and other country characteristics make it suboptimal for foreign firms to invest as much in governance as U.S. firms do. Overall, we find that minor...
