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作者：Ertimur, Yonca; Ferri, Fabrizio; Muslu, Volkan
作者单位：Duke University; New York University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We study 134 vote-no campaigns and 1,198 shareholder proposals related to executive pay between 1997 and 2007. Union pension funds sponsor most of these initiatives, yet their targeting criteria do not appear to reflect labor-related motives. Shareholders favor proposals related to the pay-setting process (e.g., subject severance pay to shareholder approval) over proposals that micromanage pay level or structure. While activists target firms with high CEO pay (whether excessive or not), voting...
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作者：Loh, Roger K.; Stulz, Rene M.
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Singapore Management University
摘要：The existing literature measures the contribution of analyst recommendation changes using average stock-price reactions. With such an approach, recommendation changes can have a significant impact even if no recommendation has a visible stock-price impact. Instead, we call a recommendation change influential only if it affects the stock price of the affected firm visibly. We show that only 12% of recommendation changes are influential. Recommendation changes are more likely to be influential i...
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作者：Haushalter, David; Lowry, Michelle
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We examine the conflicts of interest and the flow of information between divisions of financial institutions. Using data on analyst recommendations and stockholdings of investment banks advising acquirers in mergers, we find evidence that information from investment banking flows to other divisions of the bank. Specifically, following a merger announcement, changes in a bank's stockholdings of the acquirer are positively associated with changes in recommendations by its analyst. This relations...
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作者：Minnick, Kristina; Unal, Haluk; Yang, Liu
作者单位：Bentley University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We examine how managerial incentives affect acquisition decisions in the banking industry. We find that higher pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) leads to value-enhancing acquisitions. Banks whose CEOs have higher PPS have significantly better abnormal stock returns around the time of the acquisition announcements. On average, acquirers in the high-PPS group outperform their counterparts in the low-PPS group by 1.4% in a three-day window around the announcement. Higher PPS helps reduce the ...
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作者：Carr, Peter; Wu, Liuren
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); New York University
摘要：We develop a simple robust link between deep out-of-the-money American put options on a company's stock and a credit insurance contract on the company's bond. We assume that the stock price stays above a barrier B before default but drops below a lower barrier A after default, thus generating a default corridor [A, B] that the stock price can never enter. Given the presence of this default corridor, a spread between two co-terminal American put options struck within the corridor replicates a p...
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作者：Cremers, K. J. Martijn; Huang, Rocco; Sautner, Zacharias
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Michigan State University; University of Pennsylvania; Yale University
摘要：We analyze proprietary internal capital allocation data from a large retail banking group consisting of member banks and a headquarters organization. We find that capital allocations from headquarters compensate for deposit shortfalls on the bank level, suggesting that the headquarters offers deposit smoothing to member banks. We then analyze how the distribution of influence within the group relates to capital allocations and lending behavior. More influential banks are allocated more funds f...
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作者：Conyon, Martin J.; Core, John E.; Guay, Wayne R.
作者单位：IE University; University of Pennsylvania; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We compute and compare risk-adjusted CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom, where the risk adjustment is based on estimated risk premiums stemming from the equity incentives borne by CEOs. Controlling for firm and industry characteristics, we find that U.S. CEOs have higher pay, but also bear much higher stock and option incentives than U.K. CEOs. Using reasonable estimates of risk premiums, we find that risk-adjusted U.S. CEO pay does not appear to be large compared to that of U.K. ...
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作者：Stango, Victor; Zinman, Jonathan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Dartmouth College
摘要：We posit that consumer lenders shroud interest rates and market low monthly payments to price discriminate on fuzzy math or payment/interest bias: consumers' pervasive tendency to underestimate borrowing costs when an interest rate is not disclosed. We test whether mandated disclosure changes lenders' ability to price discriminate using within-household interactions between payment/interest bias and policy-induced variation in the strength of Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) enforcement across lend...
