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作者：Dottling, Robin; Rola-Janicka, Magdalena
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Imperial College London
摘要：We analyze optimal carbon pricing under financial constraints and endogenous climate-related transition and physical costs. The socially optimal emissions tax may be above or below a Pigouvian benchmark, depending on the strength of physical climate impacts on pledgeable resources. We derive necessary conditions for emissions taxes alone to implement a constrained-efficient allocation, and show a cap-and-trade system may dominate emissions taxes because it can be designed to have a less advers...
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作者：Brugler, James; Comerton-Forde, Carole
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：Dark pools can restrict access for specific trader types. We compare execution outcomes between dark pools that restrict high frequency trader access and those that do not. We find that trades executed in dark pools with more access restrictions have less order flow information leakage, adverse selection risk and post-trade order imbalances than trades in less restricted pools. Evidence from exogenous dark pool closures demonstrates that these differences are causal. The ability to segment ord...
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作者：Conklin, James N.; Gerardi, Kristopher; Lambie-Hanson, Lauren
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
摘要：We document large racial disparities in the ability of homeowners to access their accumulated housing wealth. Minority homeowners are significantly more likely to have their mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) product applications rejected than White homeowners, and the unconditional disparities are significantly larger than those found in prior studies that focused on purchase and rate/term refinance loans. Had Black homeowners faced the same MEW denial rate as White homeowners in our sample per...
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作者：Albertus, James F.; Glover, Brent; Levine, Oliver
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act unlocked as much as $1.7 trillion of U.S. multinationals' foreign cash. We examine the real and financial response to this liquidity shock and find that firms did not increase capital expenditures, employment, R&D, or M&A, regardless of financial constraints. On the financial side, firms paid out only about one-third of the new liquidity to shareholders and retained half as cash. This high retention was not associated with poor governance. The high propensity to retai...
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作者：Andrei, Daniel; Hasler, Michael
作者单位：McGill University; University of Neuchatel
摘要：We model how investor learning about monetary-policy transmission impacts asset prices. In an asset-pricing model, investors learn from realized inflation surprises how effectively monetary policy steers future inflation. Downward revisions in perceived effectiveness raise expected inflation persistence, increasing return volatility and risk premia. These effects intensify when policy deviates significantly from neutral or monetary-transmission uncertainty is high. We estimate the model using ...
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作者：Gao, Janet; Kim, Yongseok; Sevilir, Merih
作者单位：Georgetown University; Tulane University; European School of Management & Technology
摘要：We examine the survival prospects, employment profiles, and patient outcomes at private equity (PE)-acquired hospitals. Target hospitals maintain their survival rates while significantly reducing employment and wage expenditures. The number of core medical workers drops temporarily, but returns to its pre-acquisition level in the long run. However, administrative job and wage cuts persist over the long term, particularly at previously nonprofit hospitals. Using proprietary insurance claims dat...
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作者：Hu, Yunzhi; Varas, Felipe
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：Intermediaries reduce agency problems through monitoring, but credible monitoring requires sufficient retention until the loan matures. We study credit markets when intermediaries cannot commit to retention. Two structures are examined: investors lending alongside an all-equity bank and investors lending through the bank via short-term debt. With a commitment to retention, they are equivalent. Without commitment, the all-equity bank sells loans and reduces monitoring over time. Short-term debt...
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作者：Bond, Philip; Levit, Doron
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：We study the equilibrium effects of the S dimension of ESG under imperfect competition. ESG policies are pledges made by firms that constrain managers to treat their stakeholders better than market conditions alone dictate. Moderate policies limit market power and prompt managers to be more competitive; aggressive polices backfire, both for adopting firms and intended beneficiaries. In contrast to the shareholder primacy paradigm, competition in ESG policies under the stakeholder capitalism pa...
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作者：Blickle, Kristian; He, Zhiguo; Huang, Jing; Parlatore, Cecilia
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; New York University
摘要：We study how competition between asymmetrically informed banks, one specialized and one nonspecialized, affects loan prices. Both banks possess general signals regarding the borrower's quality, which they use to screen loans. The specialized bank also has access to a specialized signal on which it bases its loan pricing. This private information-based pricing makes the specialized bank bid more aggressively, mitigating the informational rent effect that gives it monopolistic power. Our finding...
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作者：Colliard, Jean-Edouard; Georg, Co-Pierre
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
摘要：We propose a framework to study regulatory complexity, based on concepts from computer science. We distinguish different dimensions of complexity, classify existing measures, develop new ones, compute them on three examples - Basel I, the Dodd-Frank Act, and the European Banking Authority's reporting rules - and test them using experiments and a survey on compliance costs. We highlight two measures that capture complexity beyond the length of a regulation. We propose a quantitative approach to...
