-
作者：Schneider, Thomas; Strahan, Philip E.; Yang, Jun
作者单位：University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman; Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Notre Dame
摘要：This paper studies banks' investment in risk management human capital following the Global Financial Crisis and the advent of stress testing. Our results suggest that 'Too Big to Fail' distortions may have weakened large banks' incentive to invest in risk management talent. Stress testing, which focuses on the largest banks, spurred demand for skilled quantitative risk managers, but only narrowly in anticipation of a test and following poor performance on a test. Stress testing does not affect...
-
作者：Altavilla, Carlo; Boucinha, Miguel; Burlon, Lorenzo; Giannetti, Mariassunta; Schumacher, Julian
作者单位：European Central Bank; Stockholm School of Economics; Swedish House of Finance
摘要：We document that the reallocation of central bank reserves towards banks with higher liquidity needs fosters credit supply. Exploiting the ECB's tiered reserve remuneration system for identification, we show that this system encouraged banks with low reserve holdings to obtain more reserves through the money market. Concomitantly, these banks reduced their securities holdings and extended more credit. We estimate that the reallocation of one euro of reserves towards banks with ex ante low rese...
-
作者：Gomes, Francisco; Peng, Cameron; Smirnova, Oksana; Zhu, Ning
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：The literature has documented reaching for yield-the phenomenon of investing more in risky assets when interest rates drop-among institutional investors. We analyze detailed transaction data from a large brokerage firm to provide direct field evidence that individual investors also exhibit this behavior. Consistent with models of portfolio choice with labor income, reaching for yield is more pronounced among younger and less-wealthy individuals. Consistent with prospect theory, reaching for yi...
-
作者：Aragon, George O.; Jiang, Yuxiang; Joenvaara, Juha; Tiu, Cristian Ioan
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Aalto University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY
摘要：We examine the adoption rates of responsible investment (RI) policies among university endowments. Adoption rates are higher among universities that face stakeholder pressure and are donation-dependent. Policy adoption predicts greater abnormal donations totaling 12 % of endowment assets, especially from socially conscious donors and during periods of higher media attention to climate change. Universities also experience greater student applications following adoptions. RI endowments have grea...
-
作者：Gresenz, Carole Roan; Mitchell, Jean M.; Rodriguez, Belicia; Wang, Crystal; Turner, R. Scott; van der Klaauw, Wilbert
作者单位：Georgetown University; Georgetown University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Georgetown University; Duke University; Stanford University
摘要：We examine the effect of undiagnosed memory disorders on credit outcomes using individually-matched nationally representative credit reporting and Medicare data. We find effects of early stage disease, years before diagnosis, on a wide range of financial outcomes, including credit card account payment delinquency and amount of delinquent balance, credit utilization among credit card account holders, mortgage delinquency and delinquent balance amount, and credit scores. Effects are pervasive, a...
-
作者：Jiang, Erica Xuewei; Zhang, Anthony Lee
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Chicago
摘要：Houses with higher value uncertainty receive less mortgage credit: mortgages backed by these houses are more likely to be rejected, have higher interest rates, and have lower loan-to-price ratios. The relationship between house value uncertainty and credit availability is driven partly by a classic channel in which uncertainty lowers debt recovery rates, and partly by a novel channel where more uncertain appraisals make regulatory constraints on loan size more likely to bind. We build a struct...
-
作者：Dyhrberg, Anne Haubo; Shkilko, Andriy; Werner, Ingrid M.
作者单位：Wilfrid Laurier University; Macquarie University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We demonstrate that off-exchange (wholesaler) executions provide significant cost savings to retail investors. Wholesaler concentration has raised regulatory concerns; however, we show that the largest wholesalers offer the lowest costs due to economies of scale. The entry of a new large wholesaler reduces incumbent scale economies, resulting in higher execution costs. Most retail brokers route to multiple wholesalers and actively monitor their performance, rewarding those offering lower execu...
-
作者：Bolton, Patrick
作者单位：Imperial College London
摘要：This article does three things: (1) it offers a slightly modernized treatment of the two well-known agency costs of external financing of Jensen and Meckling; (2) it provides a deeper exploration than they offer of the limited liability corporation, and of optimal control allocations when financial contracts are incomplete; and, (3) it assesses the lasting influence or their ideas, their multiple interpretations, as well as misinterpretations.
-
作者：Ferreira, Daniel; Nikolowa, Radoslawa
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We present a model in which firms compete for workers who value nonpecuniary job attributes, such as purpose, sustainability, political stances, or working conditions. Firms adopt production technologies that enable them to offer jobs with varying levels of these desirable attributes. Firms' profits are higher when they cater to workers with extreme preferences. In a competitive assignment equilibrium, firms become polarized and not only reflect but also amplify the polarized preferences of th...
-
作者：Polo, Alberto; Taburet, Arthur; Vo, Quynh-Anh
作者单位：Bank of England; Duke University
摘要：When lenders screen borrowers using a menu, they generate a contractual externality by rendering the composition of their competitors' borrowers worse. Using data from the UK mortgage market and a structural model of screening with endogenous menus, this paper quantifies the impact of asymmetric information on equilibrium contracts and welfare. Counterfactual simulations show that, because of the externality, there is too much screening along the loan-to-value dimension. The deadweight loss, e...
