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作者：Hochberg, Yael V.; Ljungqvist, Alexander; Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Why don't VCs eliminate excess demand for follow-on funds by raising fees? We propose a model of learning that leads to informational holdup. Current investors learn about skill whereas outside investors observe only returns. This gives current investors holdup power when the VC raises his next fund: Without their backing, no-one will fund him, as outside investors interpret the lack of backing as a sign of low skill. Holdup power diminishes the VC's ability to increase fees in line with perfo...
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作者：Kerr, William R.; Lerner, Josh; Schoar, Antoinette
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This article documents the fact that ventures funded by two successful angel groups experience superior outcomes to rejected ventures: They have improved survival, exits, employment, patenting, Web traffic, and financing. We use strong discontinuities in angel- funding behavior over small changes in their collective interest levels to implement a regression discontinuity approach. We confirm the positive effects for venture operations, with qualitative support for a higher likelihood of succes...
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作者：Celikyurt, Ugur; Sevilir, Merih; Shivdasani, Anil
作者单位：Koc University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：Venture capitalists (VCs) often serve on the board of mature public firms long after their initial public offering (IPO), even for companies that were not VC-backed at the IPO. Board appointments of VC directors are followed by increases in research and development intensity, innovation output, and greater deal activity with other VC-backed firms. VC director appointments are associated with positive announcement returns and are followed by an improvement in operating performance. Firms experi...
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作者：Chemmanur, Thomas J.; Fulghieri, Paolo
作者单位：Boston College; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：The increasingly large role played by financial intermediaries, such as venture capitalists and angels, in nurturing entrepreneurial firms and in promoting product market innovation has led to great research interest in the area of entrepreneurial finance and innovation. This paper introduces the special issue of the Review of Financial Studies dedicated to entrepreneurial finance and innovation and highlights some of the promising topics for future research in this area. The special issue com...
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作者：Acharya, Viral V.; Baghai, Ramin P.; Subramanian, Krishnamurthy V.
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Stockholm School of Economics; Indian School of Business (ISB)
摘要：We show that wrongful discharge laws-laws that protect employees against unjust dismissal-spur innovation and new firm creation. Wrongful discharge laws, particularly those that prohibit employers from acting in bad faith ex post, limit employers' ability to hold up innovating employees after the innovation is successful. By reducing the possibility of holdup, these laws enhance employees'innovative efforts and encourage firms to invest in risky but potentially mould-breaking projects. We deve...
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作者：Ferreira, Daniel; Manso, Gustavo; Silva, Andre C.
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London Business School; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：We model the impact of public and private ownership structures on firms' incentives to invest in innovative projects. We show that it is optimal to go public when exploiting existing ideas and optimal to go private when exploring new ideas. This result derives from the fact that private firms are less transparent to outside investors than are public firms. In private firms, insiders can time the market by choosing an early exit strategy if they receive bad news. This option makes insiders more...
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作者：Iyer, Rajkamal; Peydro, Jose-Luis; da-Rocha-Lopes, Samuel; Schoar, Antoinette
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Banco de Portugal; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the European interbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find that banks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease their credit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger for firms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannot compensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, the impact of illiquidity on the credit...
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作者：Robb, Alicia M.; Robinson, David T.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study capital structure choices that entrepreneurs make in their firms' initial year of operation, using restricted-access data from the Kauffman Firm Survey. Firms in our data rely heavily on external debt sources, such as bank financing, and less extensively on friends-and-family-based funding sources. Many startups receive debt financed through the personal balance sheets of the entrepreneur, effectively resulting in the entrepreneur holding levered equity claims in their startups. This ...
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作者：Tian, Xuan; Wang, Tracy Yue
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Based on a sample of venture capital (VC)-backed IPO firms, we examine whether tolerance for failure spurs corporate innovation. We develop a novel measure of VC investors' failure tolerance by examining their willingness to continue investing in underperforming ventures. We find that IPO firms backed by more failure-tolerant VC investors are significantly more innovative and VC failure tolerance is particularly important for ventures that are subject to high failure risk. We show that these r...
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作者：Bouvard, Matthieu
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：This study examines the financing of innovation in the presence of adverse selection in the capital market. An entrepreneur with private information needs outside funding for a project requiring costly experimentation. Equilibrium contracts use the duration of the experimentation period, together with pay-for-performance, to signal information to outside investors. As a result, investment is delayed, entrepreneurs with stronger growth options receive vested stock options, and entrepreneurs wit...
