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作者：Lel, Ugur; Miller, Darius P.
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Southern Methodist University
摘要：This paper exploits the staggered initiation of takeover laws across countries to examine whether the threat of takeover enhances managerial discipline. We show that following the passage of takeover laws, poorly performing firms experience more frequent takeovers; the propensity to replace poorly performing CEOs increases, especially in countries with weak investor protection; and directors of targeted firms are more likely to lose board seats following corporate-control events. Our findings ...
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作者：Hackbarth, Dirk; Haselmann, Rainer; Schoenherr, David
作者单位：Boston University; Goethe University Frankfurt; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We study distress risk premia around a bankruptcy reform that shifts bargaining power in financial distress from debtholders to shareholders. We find that the reform reduces risk factor loadings and returns of distressed stocks. The reform effect is stronger for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power. An increase in credit spreads of riskier relative to safer firms, in particular for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power, confirms a shift in bargaining powe...
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作者：Cebon, Peter; Hermalin, Benjamin E.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We derive conditions under which limits on executive compensation can enhance efficiency and benefit shareholders (but not executives). Having its hands tied in the future allows a board of directors to credibly enter into relational contracts with executives that are more efficient than performance-contingent contracts. This has implications for the ideal composition of the board. The analysis also offers insights into the political economy of executive-compensation reform.
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作者：Larrain, Mauricio
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Opening the capital account allows financially constrained firms to raise capital from abroad. Since capital and skilled labor are relative complements, this increases the relative demand for skilled labor versus unskilled labor, leading to higher wage inequality. Using aggregate data and exploiting variation in the timing of capital account openings across 20 mainly European countries, I find that opening the capital account increases aggregate wage inequality. In order to identify the mechan...
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作者：Krishnan, Karthik; Nandy, Debarshi K.; Puri, Manju
作者单位：Northeastern University; Brandeis University; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyze how increased access to financing affects firm total factor productivity (TFP) by exploiting a natural experiment following interstate banking deregulations that increased access to bank financing. We find that firms' TFP increases after their states implement these deregulations. Using a regression discontinuity approach based on the Small Business Administration's funding eligibility criteria, we show that TFP increases following the deregulations are significantly greater for fin...
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作者：Massa, Massimo; Zhang, Bohui; Zhang, Hong
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; University of New South Wales Sydney; Tsinghua University
摘要：We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-a-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings man...
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作者：Pan, Yihui; Wang, Tracy Yue; Weisbach, Michael S.
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Consistent with predictions from a stylized Bayesian learning model stock return volatility declines with CEO tenure in a convex manner, even for CEOs whose appointments occur for exogenous reasons. The decline is faster when there is higher uncertainty about the CEO's ability when there is more transparency about the firm's prospects, and when CEO ability is more important in value creation. We quantify the importance of uncertainty about CEO ability relative to the firm's fundamental cash fl...
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作者：Grullon, Gustavo; Michenaud, Sebastien; Weston, James P.
作者单位：Rice University; DePaul University
摘要：We use a regulatory experiment (Regulation SHO) that relaxes short-selling constraints on a random sample of U.S. stocks to test whether capital market frictions have an effect on stock prices and corporate decisions. We find that an increase in short-selling activity causes prices to fall, and that small firms react to these lower prices by reducing equity issues and investment. These results not only provide evidence that short-selling constraints affect asset prices, but also confirm that s...
