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作者：Norli, Oyvind; Ostergaard, Charlotte; Schindele, Ibolya
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：Blockholders' incentives to intervene in corporate governance are weakened by free-rider problems and high costs of activism. Theory suggests activists may recoup expenses through informed trading of target firms' stock when stocks are liquid. We show that stock liquidity increases the probability of activism but does less so for potentially overvalued firms for which privately informed blockholders may have greater incentives to sell their stake than to intervene. We also document that activi...
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作者：Hugonnier, Julien; Malamud, Semyon; Morellec, Erwan
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)
摘要：We develop a dynamic model of investment, financing, and cash management decisions in which investment is lumpy and firms face capital supply uncertainty. We characterize optimal policies explicitly, demonstrate that smooth-pasting conditions may not guarantee optimality, and show that firms may not follow standard single barrier policies. In the model, firms with high investment costs differ in their behaviors from firms with low investment costs, financing policy does not follow a strict pec...
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作者：Bustamante, M. Cecilia
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper characterizes how firms' strategic interaction in product markets affects the industry dynamics of investment and expected returns. In imperfectly competitive industries, a firm's exposure to systematic risk is affected by both its own investment strategy and the investment strategies of its peers, so that the dynamics of its expected returns depend on the intraindustry value spread. In the model and the data, firms' betas and returns correlate more positively in industries with low...
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作者：Dhillon, Amrita; Rossetto, Silvia
作者单位：University of London; King's College London
摘要：We analyze the determinants of a firm's ownership structure when decisions over risk are taken by majority vote of risk-averse shareholders. We show that when a fraction of small, diversified shareholders abstains from voting, mid-sized blockholders may emerge to mitigate the conflict of interests between one large shareholder, who prefers less risky investments, and these small, non-voting shareholders. The paper offers a novel explanation for the puzzling observation that many firms have mul...
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作者：Iliev, Peter; Lowry, Michelle
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Drexel University
摘要：Mutual funds vary greatly in their reliance on proxy advisory recommendations. Over 25% of funds rely almost entirely on Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations, while other funds place little weight on them. Funds with higher benefits and lower costs of researching the items up for vote are less likely to rely on ISS. These actively voting funds are less likely to vote in a one-size-fits-all manner, and they earn higher alphas, consistent with benefits from this allocation of...
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作者：Simintzi, Elena; Vig, Vikrant; Volpin, Paolo
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of London; London Business School; City St Georges, University of London
摘要：This paper exploits intertemporal variations in employment protection across countries and finds that rigidities in labor markets are an important determinant of firms' capital structure decisions. Over the 1985-2007 period, we find that reforms increasing employment protection are associated with a 187 basis point reduction in leverage. We interpret this finding to suggest that employment protection increases operating leverage, crowding out financial leverage. This result does not appear to ...
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作者：Asker, John; Farre-Mensa, Joan; Ljungqvist, Alexander
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; New York University
摘要：We investigate whether short-termism distorts the investment decisions of stock market-listed firms. To do so, we compare the investment behavior of observably similar public and private firms, using a new data source on private U.S. firms and assuming for identification that closely held private firms are subject to fewer short-termist pressures. Our results show that compared with private firms, public firms invest substantially less and are less responsive to changes in investment opportuni...
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作者：Masulis, Ronald W.; Reza, Syed Walid
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Queensland University of Technology (QUT)
摘要：Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory views of corporate philanthropy, we find that as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of firm cash holdings. Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act are associated with reduced corporate giving. Using a natural experiment, we find that corporate giving is positively (negatively) associated with CEO charity preferences (CEO shareholdings and corporate governance quality). Evidence from CEO-affiliated...
