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作者：De Angelis, David; Grullon, Gustavo; Michenaud, Sebastien
作者单位：Rice University; DePaul University
摘要：This paper examines the effects of a shock to the stock-price formation process on the design of executive incentive contracts. We find that an exogenous removal of short-selling constraints causes firms to convexify compensation payoffs by granting relatively more stock options to their managers. We also find that treated firms adopt new antitakeover provisions. These results suggest that when firms face the threat of bear raids, they incentivize managers to take actions that mitigate the adv...
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作者：Phillips, Gordon M.; Sertsios, Giorgo
作者单位：Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Universidad de los Andes (Colombia)
摘要：We exploit Medicare national coverage reimbursement approvals as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate how the financing decisions of private and publicly traded firms respond to changes in investment opportunities. We find that publicly traded companies increase their external financing and their subsequent product introductions by more than private companies in response to national coverage approvals. Private equity financing is the primary source of the increased financing for public fi...
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作者：Schoar, Antoinette; Zuo, Luo
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Cornell University
摘要：We show that economic conditions when managers enter the labor market have long-run effects on their career paths and managerial styles. Managers who began their careers during recessions become CEOs more quickly, but at smaller firms. They also have more conservative styles, such as lower investment in capital expenditures and research and development, more cost cutting, and lower leverage and working capital needs. These recession effects appear to be largely driven by the characteristics of...
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作者：Harford, Jarrad; Wang, Cong; Zhang, Kuo
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; China Europe International Business School; Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：When the fraction of a firm's cash held overseas is greater, its shareholders value that cash lower. This goes beyond a pure tax effect: the repatriation tax friction disrupts the firm's internal capital market, distorting its investment policy. Firms underinvest domestically and overinvest abroad. Our findings are more pronounced when firms are subject to higher repatriation tax rates, higher costs of borrowing, and more agency problems. Overall, our evidence suggests that a combination of ta...
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作者：Bena, Jan; Xu, Ting
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We study how product market competition affects firms' ownership structures using a large sample of closely held firms in eighteen European countries. We show that firms operating in more competitive environments have lower inside ownership and that the stakes of their outside shareholders are more dispersed. These results are explained by competition increasing the need to raise external equity and reducing private control benefits. Our findings suggest that, by changing corporate ownership s...
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作者：Kini, Omesh; Shenoy, Jaideep; Subramaniam, Venkat
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Connecticut; Tulane University
摘要：We study the impact of the financial condition of firms on firms' ability to produce safer products that result in fewer recalls. Using a variety of tests, including two quasi-natural experiments that result in exogenous negative industry cash-flow shocks, we find that firms with higher leverage or distress likelihood have a greater probability of a product recall. These firms also face more frequent and severe recalls. Further, firms with more debt due at the onset of the financial crisis exp...
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作者：Fresard, Laurent; Hege, Ulrich; Phillips, Gordon
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Dartmouth College
摘要：We investigate the role of industry specialization in horizontal cross-border mergers and acquisitions. We find that acquirers from more specialized industries in a country are more likely to buy foreign targets in countries that are less specialized in these same industries. The role of industry specialization in foreign acquisitions is more prevalent when contracting inefficiencies and exporting costs limit arm's-length relationships. The economic gains in cross-border deals are larger when ...
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作者：Zeume, Stefan
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：I exploit the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 as a shock to U.K. firms' cost of doing business. Around the Act's passage, U.K. firms operating in high-corruption countries experience a drop in firm value, while their non-U.K. competitors in these countries encounter an increase. U.K. firms respond to the Act by reducing the expansion of their subsidiary network into perceptively corrupt countries. Moreover, their sales and merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in such countries declines. ...
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作者：Duchin, Ran; Goldberg, Amir; Sosyura, Denis
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Stanford University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Using hand-collected data on divisional managers at conglomerates, we find that a change in industry pay in one division generates spillovers on managerial pay in other divisions of the same firm. These spillovers arise only within the boundaries of a conglomerate. The intra-firm spillovers increase when conglomerates have excess cash and when managers have more influence over its distribution, but decline in the presence of strong governance. These spillovers are associated with weaker perfor...
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作者：Kempf, Elisabeth; Manconi, Alberto; Spalt, Oliver
作者单位：University of Chicago; Tilburg University; Bocconi University
摘要：Investor attention matters for corporate actions. Our new identification approach constructs firm-level shareholder distraction measures, by exploiting exogenous shocks to unrelated parts of institutional shareholders' portfolios. Firms with distracted shareholders are more likely to announce diversifying, value-destroying, acquisitions. They are also more likely to grant opportunistically timed CEO stock options, more likely to cut dividends, and less likely to fire their CEO for bad performa...
