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作者：Gao, Janet; Kleiner, Kristoph; Pacelli, Joseph
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We examine whether bankers face disciplining consequences for structuring poorly performing corporate loans. We construct a novel data set containing the employment histories and loan portfolios of a large sample of corporate bankers and find that corporate credit events (i.e., downgrades, defaults, bankruptcies) increase banker turnover. The effect is pronounced when bankers issue loans with loose terms or experience severe losses. Credit events prompt bankers to adopt stricter future risk ma...
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作者：Corhay, Alexandre; Kung, Howard; Schmid, Lukas
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of London; London Business School; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Southern California; Duke University
摘要：This paper jointly examines the link between competition and expected returns in the time series and in the cross-section. To this end, we build a general equilibrium model where markups vary because of firm entry with oligopolistic competition. When concentration is high, markups are more sensitive to entry risk. We find that higher markups are associated with higher expected returns over time and across industries, in line with the data. The model can also quantitatively account for the pers...
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作者：Duchin, Ran; Gao, Zhenyu; Shu, Haibing
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：Using a unique setting in China, where the geographic distance between collective firms and local governments is highly persistent because of legal restrictions on land ownership and mobility, we investigate the role of government involvement in small firms. In our analysis of survey responses, we find that weaker government involvement, measured by greater distance from government, is associated with higher firm autonomy and reduced taxes, protectionism, and anticompetitive behavior. In our a...
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作者：Gofman, Michael; Segal, Gill; Wu, Youchang
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of Oregon
摘要：We examine empirically and theoretically the relation between firms' risk and distance to consumers in a production network. We document two novel facts: firms farther away from consumers have higher risk premiums and higher exposure to aggregate productivity. We quantitatively explain these findings using a general equilibrium model featuring a multilayer production process. The economic force is vertical creative destruction, that is, positive productivity shocks to suppliers devalue custome...
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作者：Armantier, Olivier; Holt, Charles A.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; University of Virginia
摘要：A core responsibility of the Federal Reserve is to ensure financial stability by acting as the lender of last resort through its discount window (DW). Historically, however, the DW has not been effective because its usage is stigmatized. In this paper, we develop a coordination game with adverse selection, and we test in the lab policies that have been proposed to mitigate DW stigma. We find that lowering the DW cost and making DW borrowing difficult to detect are ineffective, but regular rand...
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作者：Ai, Hengjie; Li, Jun E.; Li, Kai; Schlag, Christian
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：A common prediction of macroeconomic models of credit market frictions is that the tightness of financial constraints is countercyclical. Theory suggests a negative collateralizability premium; that is, capital that can be used as collateral to relax financial constraints insures against aggregate shocks and commands a lower risk compensation compared with noncollateralizable assets. We show that a long-short portfolio constructed using a novel measure of asset collateralizability generates an...
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作者：Walther, Ansgar; White, Lucy
作者单位：Imperial College London; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Boston University
摘要：Recent reforms have given regulators broad powers to bail-in bank creditors during financial crises. We analyze efficient bail-ins and their implementation. To preserve liquidity, regulators must avoid signaling negative private information to creditors. Therefore, optimal bail-ins in bad times only depend on public information. As a result, the optimal policy cannot be implemented if regulators have wide discretion, due to an informational time-inconsistency problem. Rules mandating tough bai...
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作者：Lowry, Michelle; Michaely, Roni; Volkova, Ekaterina
作者单位：Drexel University; University of Geneva; University of Melbourne
摘要：We analyze communications between the SEC and firms prior to IPOs using LDA analysis and KL divergence. The SEC's concerns closely map onto the regulator's stated mandate: companies increase prospectus disclosures on precise topics of SEC concern. Revenue recognition is the dominant topic of SEC concern, and it is not independently discovered by investors. Increased SEC concern about it is associated with greater secondary sales, lower post-IPO liquidity, lower post-IPO returns, and a higher p...
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作者：Ersahin, Nuri
作者单位：Michigan State University
摘要：I use U.S. Census microdata to analyze the effect of stronger creditor rights on productivity. Following the adoption of antirecharacterization laws that give lenders greater access to the collateral of firms in financial distress, treated plants' total factor productivity increases by 2.6%. This effect is concentrated among plants belonging to financially constrained firms. I explore the underlying mechanism and find that treated plants change the composition of their investments and their wo...
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作者：Ewens, Michael; Farre-Mensa, Joan
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：The deregulation of securities laws-in particular the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996-has increased the supply of private capital to late-stage private startups, which are now able to grow to a size that few private firms used to reach. NSMIA is one of a number of factors that have changed the going-public versus staying-private trade-off, helping bring about a new equilibrium where fewer startups go public, and those that do are older. This new equilibrium does not...
