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作者：Glode, Vincent; Opp, Christian C.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Over-the-counter (OTC) markets attract substantial trading volume despite exhibiting frictions absent in centralized limit-order markets. We compare the efficiency of OTC and limit-order markets when traders' expertise is endogenous. We show that asymmetric access to counterparties in OTC markets yields increased rents from expertise acquisition for a few well-connected core traders. When the existence of gains to trade is uncertain, traders' higher expertise in OTC markets can improve allocat...
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作者：Brown, David C.; Davies, Shaun William
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We analyze early-venture fundraising from dispersed, endogenously informed investors. An entrepreneur chooses a payoff-maximizing offering, and investors communicate their information by either contributing capital or abstaining. The entrepreneur uses the information conveyed by fundraising amounts to decide whether or not to undertake a risky venture. His decision threshold hedges investors against bad projects, creating a loser's blessing that encourages contributing without information. Mak...
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作者：Alok, Shashwat; Ayyagari, Meghana
作者单位：Indian School of Business (ISB); George Washington University
摘要：We document apolitical cycle in the investment decisions of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by using the constitutionally mandated election schedule in India as a source of exogenous variation in politicians' incentive to cater to voters. Using a project-level investment database, we find that SOEs announce more capital expenditure projects in election years, especially in infrastructure, and in districts with close elections, high-ranking politicians, and left-wing incumbents. SOE projects in ...
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作者：Bruche, Max; Malherbe, Frederic; Meisenzahl, Ralf R.
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; University of London; University College London; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：What is the economic role played by arrangers of leveraged loans, and what are the risks they face? We provide evidence that arrangers solve a demand discovery problem. Investors have incentives to feign little interest in the loan to obtain better terms. To deter such behavior, arrangers underprice hot deals and ration investors on cold deals. The risk associated with demand discovery is often shared between borrowers and arrangers. One implication is that to ration investors on cold deals, a...
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作者：Levine, Ross; Lin, Chen; Peng, Qilin; Xie, Wensi
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Hong Kong; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We investigate how communication within banks affects small business lending. Using travel times between a bank's headquarters and its branches to proxy for the costs of communicating soft information, we exploit shocks to these travel times-the introduction of new airline routes-to evaluate the impact of within-bank communication costs on small business loans. We find that reducing headquarters-branch travel time boosts small business lending in the branch's county. Several extensions suggest...
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作者：Black, Lamont K.; Krainer, John R.; Nichols, Joseph B.
作者单位：DePaul University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：Two main creditors exist in commercial real estate: arm's-length investors and banks. We model commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) as the less informed source of credit. In equilibrium, these investors fund properties with a low probability of distress, and banks fund properties that may require renegotiation. As a natural experiment, we test the model using the collapse of the CMBS market during 2007-2009, when banks funded both collateral types. Our results show that properties like...
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作者：Denis, Diane K.; Jochem, Torsten; Rajamani, Anjana
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Amsterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers' compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely with their weak-vote peers in the executive labor market, and when those peers perform well. Reductions occur following peers' disclosures of revised pay and are proportional to those needed to retain firm...
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作者：Nagel, Stefan; Purnanandam, Amiyatosh
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We adapt structural models of default risk to take into account the special nature of bank assets. The usual assumption of lognormally distributed asset values is not appropriate for banks. Typical bank assets are risky debt claims with concave payoffs. Because of the payoff nonlinearity, bank asset volatility rises following negative shocks to borrower asset values. As a result, standard structural models with constant asset volatility can severely understate banks' default risk in good times...
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作者：Hong, Harrison; Karolyi, G. Andrew; Scheinkman, Jose A.
作者单位：Columbia University; Cornell University; Princeton University
摘要：Climate finance is the study of local and global financing of public and private investment that seeks to support mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. In 2017, the Review of Financial Studies launched a competition among scholars to develop research proposals on the topic with the goal of publishing this special volume. We describe the competition, how the nine projects featured in this volume came to be published, and frame their findings within what we view as a broader climate fi...
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作者：Xu, Ke-Li
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Research in finance and macroeconomics has routinely employed multiple horizons to test asset return predictability. In a simple predictive regression model, we find the popular scaled test can have zero power when the predictor is not sufficiently persistent. A new test based on implication of the short-run model is suggested and is shown to be uniformly more powerful than the scaled test. The newtest can accommodate multiple predictors. Compared with various other widely used tests, simulati...
