Financing Efficiency of Securities-Based Crowdfunding

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brown, David C.; Davies, Shaun William
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaa025
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 3975
• 关键词: IPO; INFORMATION; prices; LIMITS

摘要

We analyze early-venture fundraising from dispersed, endogenously informed investors. An entrepreneur chooses a payoff-maximizing offering, and investors communicate their information by either contributing capital or abstaining. The entrepreneur uses the information conveyed by fundraising amounts to decide whether or not to undertake a risky venture. His decision threshold hedges investors against bad projects, creating a loser's blessing that encourages contributing without information. Making the offering less attractive to investors mitigates the loser's blessing but can give rise to a winner's curse. Both tensions reduce financing efficiency.