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作者：Demichelis, Stefano; Weibull, Jorgen W.
作者单位：University of Pavia; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：Language is a powerful coordination device. We generalize the cheap-talk approach to pre-play communication by way of introducing a meaning correspondence between messages and actions, and by postulating two axioms met by natural languages. Players have a lexicographic preference, second to material payoffs, against deviating from the meaning correspondence. Under two-sided communication in generic and symmetric n x n-coordination games, a Nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic com...
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作者：Condliffe, Simon; Link, Charles R.
作者单位：Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education (PASSHE); West Chester University of Pennsylvania; University of Delaware
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作者：Heidhues, Paul; Koszegi, Botond
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We modify the Salop (1979) model of price competition with differentiated products by assuming that consumers are loss averse relative to a reference point given by their recent expectations about the purchase. Consumers' sensitivity to losses in money increases the price responsiveness of demand-and hence the intensity of competition-at higher relative to lower market prices, reducing or eliminating price variation both within and between products. When firms face common stochastic costs, in ...
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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：Based on recent neuroscience evidence, we model the brain as a dual-system organization subject to three conflicts: asymmetric information, temporal horizon, and incentive salience. Under the first and second conflicts, we show that the uninformed system imposes a positive link between consumption and labor at every period. Furthermore, decreasing impatience endogenously emerges as a consequence of these two conflicts. Under the first and third conflicts, it becomes optimal to set a consumptio...
