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作者：Garrett, Daniel G.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：When can financial advisor conflicts of interest generate worse outcomes for clients? A regulation following from Dodd-Frank prohibits municipal advisors from simultaneously acting as bond underwriters. Using a difference-in-differences approach and 20,051 bond auctions, I test whether limited advisor privileges affect financial advice and borrower outcomes. Financing costs of bonds with potential dual advisor-underwriters fall by 11.4 basis points after the advisor is no longer allowed to und...
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作者：Mezza, Alvaro; Ringo, Daniel; Sommer, Kamila
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：This paper provides novel evidence that increased student loan debts, caused by rising tuitions, increase borrowers' demand for additional consumer debt, while simultaneously restricting their ability to access it. The net effect of student loan debt on consumer borrowing varies by market, depending on whether the supply or demand channel dominates. In loosely underwritten credit markets, increased student loan debt causes borrowing to increase, while in tightly underwritten markets, increased...
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作者：Dey, Aiyesha; Starkweather, Austin; White, Joshua T.
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We study how Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) affect firms' engagement with shareholders. Our analyses exploit a quasi-natural experiment using say-on-pay voting outcomes near a threshold that triggers ISS to review engagement activities. Firms receiving ISS treatment exhibit swift and substantive increases in extensive and intensive margins of engagement, especially when their boards have higher agency conflicts and directors are more likely to lose voting support from ISS. Increases ...
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作者：Flynn, Sean; Ghent, Andra; Tchistyi, Alexei
作者单位：Cornell University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：We show that commercial mortgage borrowers behave opportunistically to attempt to obtain principal reductions. We develop a model in which lenders cannot perfectly observe borrowers' use values and renegotiation is costly. We then exploit a tax rule change that reduced the cost of renegotiation. Consistent with the model predictions, borrowers with high private use values of the property are more likely to transfer into special servicing when lenders have a higher capacity to negotiate princip...
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作者：Schneider, Thomas; Strahan, Philip E.; Yang, Jun
作者单位：University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman; Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Notre Dame
摘要：Relative performance evaluation (RPE) intensifies competitive pressure by tying executive compensation to the profits of rivals. We show that these contracts make loan syndication harder by reducing banks' willingness to participate in loans underwritten by banks named in their RPE contracts. Lead arranger banks, which are more frequently named in RPE, hold larger shares of the loans they syndicate, and their borrowers receive smaller and fewer loans and face higher spreads. Our results highli...
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作者：Gabriel, Stuart; Lutz, Chandler
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Charlotte
摘要：We measure the causal impact of reductions in benchmark interest rates on the renegotiation and performance of distressed loans, using 2000s subprime mortgages as a laboratory. Subprime borrowers treated with larger benchmark rate reductions benefited from increased debt-renegotiation probabilities and lower debt-service payments. Modification rates were similar among current and delinquent borrowers but higher for real estate investors, highlighting the role of financial acumen in renegotiati...
