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作者：Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo
作者单位：Baylor University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute
摘要：We study the impact of uncertainty on optimal contracting in a multidivisional firm. Headquarters contract with division managers to induce effort. Uncertainty creates endogenous disagreement, thereby aggravating moral hazard. By hedging uncertainty, headquarters design incentive contracts that reduce disagreement and lower incentive provision costs, thereby promoting effort. Because hedging uncertainty can conflict with hedging risk, optimal contracts differ from those in standard principal-a...
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作者：Li, Jiasun; Mann, William
作者单位：George Mason University; Emory University
摘要：We present a model rationalizing the economic value of digital tokens for launching peer-to-peer platforms. By using the blockchain to transparently distribute tokens before the platform launches, a token sale overcomes later coordination failures between the platform's users. This result follows from forward induction reasoning, under which the costly and observable action of token acquisition credibly communicates the intent to participate on the platform. Our framework demonstrates the appl...
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作者：Martin, Thorsten
作者单位：Bocconi University; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
摘要：I study the real effects of centralized derivative markets using the staggered introduction of futures contracts for different steel products in the United States. Employing a difference-in-differences strategy, I find that the arrival of centralized futures markets improves price transparency and risk management in the underlying product market: price dispersion decreases and steel producers increase their hedging activity. Moreover, market share is reallocated toward low-cost producers, whil...
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作者：Giambona, Erasmo; Kumar, Anil; Phillips, Gordon M.
作者单位：Syracuse University; Aarhus University; Danish Finance Institute; Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study how risk management through hedging affects firms and competition among firms in the life insurance industry, an industry with over 7 trillion in assets and over 1,000 private and public firms. We examine firms after a staggered state-level reform that reduces the costs of hedging by granting derivatives superpriority in case of insolvency. We show that firms that are likely to face costly external finance increase hedging and reduce risk and the probability of receivership. Firms tha...
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作者：Loewenstein, Mark; Qin, Zhenjiang
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Macau
摘要：Financial transaction taxes, or generally transaction costs, are salient in derivatives markets and seldom studied in equilibrium models. We study a tractable model with proportional transaction costs where agents trade a derivative with nonlinear payoffs to hedge nontraded endowments. We show that trade is sustained in an equilibrium with transaction costs only if there is sufficient heterogeneity in risk aversion. When there is trade, the equilibrium return variance increases in transaction ...
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作者：John, Kose; Rivera, Thomas J.; Saleh, Fahad
作者单位：New York University; McGill University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We develop an economic model to compare equilibrium security of Proof-of-Work (PoW) versus Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains. We derive general conditions to determine when PoW blockchains are more secure than otherwise equivalent PoS blockchains and vice versa. Applying real-world parameter values to these conditions, we demonstrate that PoS blockchains are more secure than otherwise equivalent PoW blockchains. Furthermore, we demonstrate that PoS's security advantage over PoW is particularly ...
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作者：Abrardi, Laura; Colombo, Luca; Tedeschi, Piero
作者单位：Polytechnic University of Turin; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要：The availability of big data and analytics expertise provides insurers with informational advantages over policyholders in estimating risk. We study competition between heterogeneously informed insurers, showing that their information may or may not be revealed in equilibrium. We find that all equilibria are profitable and that noninformative equilibria entail risk pooling and possibly efficiency. In informative equilibria, the signaling problem interacts with the screening problem that arises...
