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作者：Bharath, Sreedhar T.; Hertzel, Michael
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper examines how external governance pressure affects the type of debt that firms issue. Consistent with a governance mechanism substitution effect, we find that an exogenous increase (decrease) in governance pressure from the product (takeover) market has a significant negative (positive) impact on the use of bank (public debt) financing over public debt (bank loan) issuance. Tests using changes in the strictness of loan covenants provide corroborative evidence. These findings are cons...
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作者：Edmans, Alex; Levit, Doron; Reilly, Devin
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute; Analysis Group Inc.
摘要：Conventional wisdom is that diversification weakens governance by spreading investors too thinly. We show that, when investors own multiple firms (common ownership), governance through both voice and exit can strengthen-even if the firms are in unrelated industries. Under common ownership, informed investors have flexibility over which assets to sell upon a liquidity shock. They sell low-quality firms first, thereby increasing price informativeness. In a voice model, investors' incentives to m...
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作者：Hanson, Samuel G.; Scharfstein, David S.; Sunderam, Adi
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We develop a model of government portfolio choice in which the government chooses the scale of risky projects in the presence of market failures and tax distortions. These frictions motivate the government to manage social risk and fiscal risk. Social risk management favors programs that ameliorate market failures in bad times. Fiscal risk management makes unattractive programs involving large government outlays when other government programs also require large outlays. These two risk manageme...
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作者：Busse, Jeffrey A.; Tong, Lin; Tong, Qing; Zhang, Zhe
作者单位：Emory University; Fordham University; Renmin University of China; Singapore Management University
摘要：We construct a new measure of trading regularity, capturing the extent to which investors trade on a regular basis. Institutional investors that regularly trade outperform those that trade less regularly. The performance of funds that regularly trade persists for at least a year. Among those who trade most regularly, larger funds perform relatively worse, because they incur higher transaction costs associated with their larger trades. Institutions that regularly trade generate superior perform...
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作者：Basak, Suleyman; Chabakauri, Georgy; Yavuz, M. Deniz
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：Empirical evidence suggests that investor protection significantly affects ownership concentration and asset prices. We develop a dynamic asset pricing model to address the empirical regularities and uncover some of the underlying mechanisms at play. Our model features a controlling shareholder that endogenously accumulates control over a firm, and diverts a fraction of its output. Better investor protection decreases stock holdings of controlling shareholders, increases stock mean returns, an...
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作者：Hadlock, Charles J.; Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam
作者单位：Michigan State University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We study blockholder presence in a large panel and document substantial heterogeneity in holding periods, position sizes, and positions taken across blockholder types. Nonfinancial blocks are more likely to be observed in smaller, riskier, younger, and less-liquid firms. These patterns are either not evident or reversed for financial blocks. For all but small financial blocks, we detect significant negative interdependence in blockholder investment decisions, with the presence of one blockhold...
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作者：Agarwal, Vikas; Zhao, Haibei
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Lehigh University
摘要：The Investment Company Act of 1940 restricts interfund lending and borrowing within a mutual fund family, but families can apply for regulatory exemptions to participate in such transactions. We find that the monitoring mechanisms and investment restrictions influence the family's decision to apply for the interfund lending programs. We document several benefits of such programs for equity funds. First, participating funds reduce cash holdings and increase investments in illiquid assets. Secon...
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作者：Levit, Doron
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper studies communications between investors and firms as a form of corporate governance. Activist investors cannot force their ideas on companies; they must persuade the board or other shareholders that implementing these ideas is beneficial to the firm. I show that the threat of voice (i.e., launching a public campaign) facilitates communication, whereas the option to exit facilitates communication if and only if the proposal is risky relative to the status quo or voice is ineffective...
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作者：Acheson, Graeme G.; Campbell, Gareth; Turner, John D.
作者单位：University of Stirling; Queens University Belfast
摘要：In the late nineteenth century Britain had almost no mandatory shareholder protections, but had very developed financial markets. We argue that private contracting between shareholders and corporations meant that the absence of statutory protections was immaterial. Using approximately 500 articles of association from before 1900, we code the protections offered to shareholders in these private contracts. We find that firms voluntarily offered shareholders many of the protections that were subs...
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作者：Boyarchenko, Nina; Fuster, Andreas; Lucca, David O.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Swiss National Bank (SNB)
摘要：Because most mortgages in the United States are securitized in agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), yield spreads on MBS are a key determinant of homeowners' funding costs. We study variation in MBS spreads in the time series and across securities and document that MBS spreads show a pronounced cross-sectional smile with respect to the securities' coupon rates. We present a new pricing model that uses stripped MBS prices to identify the contribution of non-interest-rate prepayment risk to ...
