Soft Shareholder Activism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levit, Doron
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhy119
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2775
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; Ownership structure; COSTS; COMMUNICATION; EFFICIENCY; liquidity; investor; talk

摘要

This paper studies communications between investors and firms as a form of corporate governance. Activist investors cannot force their ideas on companies; they must persuade the board or other shareholders that implementing these ideas is beneficial to the firm. I show that the threat of voice (i.e., launching a public campaign) facilitates communication, whereas the option to exit facilitates communication if and only if the proposal is risky relative to the status quo or voice is ineffective as a governance mechanism. The analysis identifies factors that contribute to successful dialogues between investors and firms.