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作者：Hu, Zhongchen
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：Flooding is among the costliest natural disasters in many countries. To protect collateral, many mortgage borrowers in the United States are legally required to maintain flood insurance. However, lax enforcement leads to frequent policy lapses. This paper shows that lenders provide credit contingent on borrowers' insurance incentives. Exploiting exogenous premium rises ($266 annually) that disincentivize insurance take-up, I find mortgage denial rates dramatically increase by 0.49-0.81 pp. By ...
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作者：Lyonnet, Victor; Chretien, Edouard
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Traditional and shadow banks interacted in similar ways in the 2007 and COVID-19 crises, when both assets and liabilities flew out of shadow banks and into traditional banks. We explain these facts in a model of the coexistence of traditional and shadow banks in which liabilities and assets flow from the former to the latter in good times, avoiding regulation, and move the other way in a crisis, alleviating fire sales. The model sheds light on how regulations for traditional banks have (uninte...
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作者：Gupta, Deeksha; Kopytov, Alexandr; Starmans, Jan
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Rochester; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We show that socially responsible investors can have a negative impact by slowing the pace of firm reform. Investors with broad prosocial preferences value acquiring dirty firms with high negative production externalities because they can reform these firms. The anticipation of trading gains for dirty firms decreases the incentive of current firm owners to reduce externalities proactively, potentially causing delay in reform. The presence of financial investors-alongside socially responsible i...
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作者：Aiello, Darren; Garmaise, Mark; Nadauld, Taylor
作者单位：Brigham Young University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study intermediation in the housing market. Using data from an online platform utilized by real estate agents to generate leads, we identify exogenous intermediary attention arising from the quasi-randomized ordering of potential listings. Greater intermediary attention leads to an increased probability of listing with an agent and selling quickly, and a higher transaction price. The listing and transaction probabilities of neighboring properties decrease in intermediary attention. These re...
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作者：Davis, Carter
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：What is the demand elasticity of statistical arbitrageurs that invest according to the advice of modern cross-sectional asset pricing models? Thirteen models from the literature exhibit strikingly inelastic demand, in contrast to classical models that rely on statistical arbitrageurs to create elastic market demand for assets. This inelasticity arises from the difficulty of trading against price changes. A quantitative equilibrium model shows that aggregate demand remains inelastic even with t...
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作者：Albertus, James F.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：I find that foreign multinational firms engage in tax-motivated income shifting out of the United States. The analysis uses novel data on foreign-owned U.S. subsidiaries as well as variation in foreign countries' tax rates and controlled foreign corporation rules. Foreign multinational firms primarily rely on tax-motivated transfer pricing to shift income out of the United States, and the aggregate amount of shifted income is modest. When foreign tax policy changes inhibit income shifting, for...
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作者：Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo
作者单位：Baylor University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute
摘要：We study the impact of uncertainty on optimal contracting in a multidivisional firm. Headquarters contract with division managers to induce effort. Uncertainty creates endogenous disagreement, thereby aggravating moral hazard. By hedging uncertainty, headquarters design incentive contracts that reduce disagreement and lower incentive provision costs, thereby promoting effort. Because hedging uncertainty can conflict with hedging risk, optimal contracts differ from those in standard principal-a...
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作者：Jansen, Kristy A. E.; Klingler, Sven; Ranaldo, Angelo; Duijm, Patty
作者单位：University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Frankfurt School Finance & Management; University of Basel; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); European Central Bank; De Nederlandsche Bank NV
摘要：Pension funds use interest rate swaps to hedge the interest rate risk arising from their liabilities. Analyzing regulatory data on Dutch pension funds, we show that pension funds with worse funding ratios, indicating greater fragility, use swaps more aggressively. These swap positions expose pension funds to the risk of margin calls, which can exceed 6% of their total assets, when interest rates rise. Pension funds respond to realized margin calls by selling safe government bonds with medium-t...
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作者：Ruan, Tianyue; Vij, Siddharth
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：We argue that heightened regulation on large banks contributed to the rise in fragility of smaller banks revealed by the 2023 regional bank crisis. In 2018, regulators restricted Wells Fargo, the third largest U.S. bank, from growing its total assets. We estimate this asset cap led Wells Fargo to give up deposits amounting to 2.2% of aggregate bank deposits. These deposits, primarily uninsured, were reallocated to banks geographically proximate to Wells Fargo, including smaller, less regulated...
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作者：Han, Lina; Huang, Xing; Kadan, Ohad; Wu, Jimmy
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; Washington University (WUSTL); Cornell University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Iowa
摘要：We examine the role of race and ethnicity in the mutual fund context at two distinct levels. At the fund manager level, we document a co-racial tilt-funds managed by minority-dominant (White-dominant) teams allocate larger portfolio weights to minority-led (White-led) firms. This tilt is not associated with superior performance. It diminishes as fund managers gain experience, suggesting the presence of inaccurate statistical discrimination. At the investor level, we find that minority-dominant...
