What Problem Do Intermediaries Solve? Evidence From Real Estate Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aiello, Darren; Garmaise, Mark; Nadauld, Taylor
• 署名单位: Brigham Young University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454; 1465-7368
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaf061
• 发表日期: 2026-02
• 页码: 562-604
• 关键词: G24; D83; R31; information asymmetries; search; MODEL

摘要

We study intermediation in the housing market. Using data from an online platform utilized by real estate agents to generate leads, we identify exogenous intermediary attention arising from the quasi-randomized ordering of potential listings. Greater intermediary attention leads to an increased probability of listing with an agent and selling quickly, and a higher transaction price. The listing and transaction probabilities of neighboring properties decrease in intermediary attention. These results contrast sharply with endogenous correlations and provide causal evidence that intermediaries resolve property-level frictions deriving from search, information, or behavioral considerations but do not mitigate neighborhood-level information asymmetries.