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作者：BERGMAN, YZ; CALLEN, JL
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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作者：GOLDENBERG, DH
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作者：BOEHMER, E; MUSUMECI, J; POULSEN, AB
作者单位：American University; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Many authors have identified the hazards of ignoring event-induced variance in event studies. To determine the practical extent of the problem, we simulate an event with stochastic effects. We find that when an event causes even minor increases in variance, the most commonly-used methods reject the null hypothesis of zero average abnormal return too frequently when it is true, although they are reasonably powerful when it is false. We demonstrate that a simple adjustment to the cross-sectional...
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作者：JORDAN, BD; JORDAN, SD
摘要：This study uses Treasury bond triplets, which consist of three different Treasury issues with a common maturity date, to investigate the theoretical and empirical influence of tax strategies on Treasury prices. The tax-option effect, which arises from the right to optimally realize gains and losses for tax purposes, is found to induce convexity in the relation among triplet bond prices, but the effect is too small to create an arbitrage opportunity. A previous study [Litzenberger and Rolfo (19...
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作者：DEANGELO, H; DEANGELO, L
摘要：This paper studies managerial compensation, financial reporting, and dividend policies of the seven major domestic steel producers during requests for union concessions. Substantial layoffs, reported losses, and sacrifices by nonunion stakeholders buttressed managers' case for union concessions. From 1980 to 1988, sample firms reduced their work force by about 300,000 (almost two-thirds) and annual wage payments from $16.1 to $8.6 billion. Reported income is lower during union negotiations, co...
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作者：KIM, O; VERRECCHIA, RE
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In this paper we analyze how anticipating a forthcoming public announcement affects the market reaction to the announcement by altering investors' incentives to acquire private information. Specifically, we study price change, volume, and information asymmetry at the time of the announcement. We also investigate how information acquisition, information asymmetry, price, and volume are influenced by the quality of prior knowledge, the marginal cost of gathering information, the degree of risk t...
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作者：FERSON, WE; CONSTANTINIDES, GM
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作者：BHAGAT, S; JEFFERIS, RH
作者单位：University of Chicago; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：The likelihood that a firm will enact a management-sponsored antitakeover charter amendment depends on ownership structure. This implies that the adoption of antitakeover amendments may be anticipated. Then announcement returns provide a biased estimate of wealth effects. An estimator that corrects for the bias induced by anticipation indicates that the enactment of an antitakeover amendment is associated with a statistically significant decrease in shareholder wealth. The voting power of empl...
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作者：ROGALSKI, RJ; SEWARD, JK
摘要：We argue that hedging and risk management activities of modern corporations arise as a direct consequence of attempts to create shareholder wealth through financial innovation. We formalize this argument by examining in detail corporate issues of foreign currency exchange warrants. We then focus on one multiple issuer to demonstrate how the foreign exchange risk created by the sale of the warrants can be eliminated. The use of off-balance-sheet risk management techniques to lock in the benefit...
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作者：BALDWIN, CY; BHATTACHARYYA, S
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper analyzes the sale of Conrail (Consolidated Rail Corporation) and finds three problems: first, a contingent claim gave the seller (the U.S. Government) conflicting objectives; second, bidders in the auction valued Conrail differently and thus did not compete effectively; and third, Conrail's management had an information advantage over the seller and outside bidders. These three factors can be present in any corporate divestiture and will tend to decrease the seller's revenue. We dis...
