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作者：Hoechle, Daniel; Schmid, Markus; Walter, Ingo; Yermack, David
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Basel; New York University
摘要：We investigate whether the diversification discount occurs partly as an artifact of poor corporate governance. In panel data models, we find that the discount narrows by 16% to 21% when we add governance variables as regression controls. We also estimate Heckman selection models that account for the endogeneity of diversification and dynamic panel generalized method of moments models that account for the endogeneity of both diversification and governance. We find that the diversification disco...
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作者：Schultz, Paul
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：I examine how transparency and interdealer trading affects prices investors pay in municipal bond offerings. Real-time trade reporting for municipal bonds started January 31, 2005. The dispersion of purchase prices fell sharply at that time. There was little impact on average markups for most trades, but they increased for purchases of more than $100,000. Bonds often pass through a series of dealers before being placed with a buy-and-hold investor. As the interdealer trades progress, trade siz...
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作者：Stambaugh, Robert F.; Yu, Jianfeng; Yuan, Yu
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This study explores the role of investor sentiment in a broad set of anomalies in cross-sectional stock returns. We consider a setting in which the presence of market-wide sentiment is combined with the argument that overpricing should be more prevalent than underpricing, due to short-sale impediments. Long-short strategies that exploit the anomalies exhibit profits consistent with this setting. First, each anomaly is stronger (its long-short strategy is more profitable) following high levels ...
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作者：Cassell, Cory A.; Huang, Shawn X.; Sanchez, Juan Manuel; Stuart, Michael D.
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
摘要：CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm. Because these characteristics of inside debt expose the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors, theory predicts that CEOs with large inside debt holdings will display lower levels of risk-seeking behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings...
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作者：Edelen, Roger M.; Evans, Richard B.; Kadlec, Gregory B.
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of California System; University of California Davis; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：This study provides empirical evidence on the role of disclosure in resolving agency conflicts in delegated investment management. For certain expenditures, fund managers have alternative means of payment which differ greatly in their opacity: payments can be expensed (relatively transparent): or bundled with brokerage commissions (relatively opaque). We find that the return impact of opaque payments is significantly more negative than that of transparent payments. Moreover, we find a differen...
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作者：Alti, Aydogan; Sulaeman, Johan
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Southern Methodist University
摘要：One of the most prominent stylized facts in corporate finance is that equity issues tend to follow periods of high stock returns. We document that firms exhibit such timing behavior only in response to high returns that coincide with strong institutional investor demand. When not accompanied by institutional purchases, stock price increases have little impact on the likelihood of equity issuance. The results highlight the importance of market reception for the timing of equity issues. (C) 2011...
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作者：Chava, Sudheer; Purnanandam, Amiyatosh
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：We provide causal evidence that adverse capital shocks to banks affect their borrowers' performance negatively. We use an exogenous shock to the U.S. banking system during the Russian crisis of Fall 1998 to separate the effect of borrowers' demand of credit from the supply of credit by the banks. Firms that primarily relied on banks for capital suffered larger valuation losses during this period and subsequently experienced a higher decline in their capital expenditure and profitability as com...
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作者：Thompson, Samuel B.
摘要：When estimating finance panel regressions, it is common practice to adjust standard errors for correlation either across firms or across time. These procedures are valid only if the residuals are correlated either across time or across firms, but not across both. This paper shows that it is very easy to calculate standard errors that are robust to simultaneous correlation along two dimensions, such as firms and time. The covariance estimator is equal to the estimator that clusters by firm, plu...
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作者：Billett, Matthew T.; Garfinkel, Jon A.; Jiang, Yi
作者单位：University of Iowa; California State University System; California State University Fullerton
摘要：Does corporate governance affect the timing of large investment projects? Hazard model estimates suggest strong shareholder governance may deter managers from pursuing large investments. Controlling for investment opportunities, firms with good governance experience longer spells between large investments. However, in the presence of financial constraints or strong CEO incentives (high delta (a)), we find no such timing differences. Finally, these higher investment hazard firms exhibit signifi...
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作者：Uysal, Vahap B.
作者单位：University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman
摘要：This study finds that managers take deviations from their target capital structures into account when planning and structuring acquisitions. Specifically, firms that are overleveraged relative to their target debt ratios are less likely to make acquisitions and are less likely to use cash in their offers. Furthermore, they acquire smaller targets and pay lower premiums. Managers of overleveraged firms also actively rebalance their capital structures when they anticipate a high likelihood of ma...
