-
作者：Cronqvist, Henrik; Siegel, Stephan
作者单位：China Europe International Business School; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：For a long list of investment biases, including lack of diversification, excessive trading, and the disposition effect, we find that genetic differences explain up to 45% of the remaining variation across individual investors, after controlling for observable individual characteristics. The evidence is consistent with a view that investment biases are manifestations of innate and evolutionary ancient features of human behavior. We find that work experience with finance reduces genetic predispo...
-
作者：Van Wesep, Edward D.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：Increasing concern over corporate governance has led to calls for more shareholder influence over corporate decisions, but allowing shareholders to vote on more issues may not affect the quality of governance. We should expect instead that, under current rules, shareholder voting will implement the preferences of the majority of large shareholders and management. This is because majority rule offers little incentive for small shareholders to vote. I offer a potential remedy in the form of a ne...
-
作者：Ishii, Joy; Xuan, Yuhai
作者单位：Stanford University; Harvard University
摘要：This article investigates the effect of social ties between acquirers and targets on merger performance. We find that the extent of cross-firm social connection between directors and senior executives at the acquiring and the target firms has a significantly' negative effect on the abnormal returns to the acquirer and to the combined entity upon merger announcement. Moreover, acquirer-target social ties significantly increase the likelihood that the target firm's chief executive officer (CEO) ...
-
作者：Baranchuk, Nina; Kieschnick, Robert; Moussawi, Rabih
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Prior research suggests that executive option grants that do not quickly vest provide managers with better incentives to pursue long-term, instead of short-term, objectives. Previous research also suggests that the pursuit of long-term objectives could be undermined by the risk of early termination. We conjecture that these arguments jointly suggest that managers are better motivated to pursue innovation when they are given more incentive compensation with longer vesting periods for unexercise...
-
作者：Fos, Vyacheslav; Tsoutsoura, Margarita
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Chicago
摘要：This paper shows that proxy contests have a significant adverse effect on careers of incumbent directors. Following a proxy contest, directors experience a significant decline in the number of directorships not only in the targeted company, but also in other nontargeted companies. The results are established using the universe of all proxy contests during 1996-2010. To isolate the effect of the proxy contest, our empirical strategy uses within-firm variation in directors' exposure to the possi...
-
作者：Jacobsen, Stacey
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：To examine the market response to positive revelations of chief executive officer (CEO) quality, this study focuses on CEOs who withdraw acquisition bids when the price becomes increasingly expensive. Firms that withdrawal for price-related reasons earn higher withdrawal returns than firms that withdraw for other reasons. This relation is stronger when CEO uncertainty and discretion is high. CEOs unwilling to increase the offer price are less likely to be replaced and more likely to advance to...
-
作者：Chan, Kalok; Chan, Yue-Cheong
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：We investigate what stock return synchronicity reflects in terms of price informativeness by examining its effect on the pricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Based on 5,087 SEOs from 1984 to 2007, we find a significantly negative relation between stock return synchronicity (estimated as the logit transformation of the R-squared statistic from a two-factor regression) and SEO discounts (the percentage differences between pre-offer day closing prices and offer prices). The negative relat...
-
作者：Custodio, Claudia; Metzger, Daniel
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Downtown Phoenix; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We study CEOs with a career background in finance. Firms with financial expert CEOs hold less cash, more debt, and engage in more share repurchases. Financial expert CEOs are more financially sophisticated: they are less likely to use one companywide discount rate instead of a project-specific one, they manage financial policies more actively, and their firm investments are less sensitive to cash flows. Financial expert CEOs are able to raise external funds even when credit conditions are tigh...
-
作者：Osili, Una Okonkwo; Paulson, Anna
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：We show that individuals who have experienced a systemic banking crisis are 11 percentage points less likely to use banks in the U.S. than otherwise similar individuals who emigrated from the same country but did not live through a crisis. This finding is robust to controlling for exposure to other macroeconomic events and to various methods for addressing potential bias due to migrant self-selection. Consistent with the view that personal experience plays an important role in decision-making,...
-
作者：Jorion, Philippe; Schwarz, Christopher
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：A discontinuity, or kink, at zero in the hedge fund net return distribution has been interpreted as evidence of managers manipulating returns to avoid showing small losses. Instead, we propose alternative explanations for this phenomenon. In particular, we show that incentive fees can mechanistically create a kink in the net return distribution. This mechanism accounts for almost the entire kink observed in the large, liquid Long-Short Equity style. Furthermore, we show that asset illiquidity ...
