Motivating innovation in newly public firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baranchuk, Nina; Kieschnick, Robert; Moussawi, Rabih
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.11.010
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 578-588
• 关键词: innovation; Vesting period; Incentive compensation

摘要

Prior research suggests that executive option grants that do not quickly vest provide managers with better incentives to pursue long-term, instead of short-term, objectives. Previous research also suggests that the pursuit of long-term objectives could be undermined by the risk of early termination. We conjecture that these arguments jointly suggest that managers are better motivated to pursue innovation when they are given more incentive compensation with longer vesting periods for unexercised options and yet some protection from disruptive takeover threats. Our evidence for a sample of newly public firms is consistent with more innovative firms jointly choosing such a combination. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.