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作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often take the form of restrictions on the numbers of agents on one side of the market matched to certain subsets on the other side. Real-life examples include restrictions on regions in medical matching, academic master's programs in graduate admission, and state-financed seats for college admission. Motivated by these markets, we study design of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We sho...
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作者：Callen, Michael; Long, James D.
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：We investigate the relationship between political networks, weak institutions, and election fraud during the 2010 parliamentary election in Afghanistan combining: (i) data on political connections between candidates and election officials; (ii) a nationwide controlled evaluation of a novel monitoring technology; and (iii) direct measurements of aggregation fraud. We find considerable evidence of aggregation fraud in favor of connected candidates and that the announcement of a new monitoring te...
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作者：Collard-Wexler, Allan; De Loecker, Jan
作者单位：Duke University; Princeton University
摘要：We measure the impact of a drastic new technology for producing steel-the minimill-on industry-wide productivity in the US steel industry, using unique plant-level data between 1963 and 2002. The sharp increase in the industry's productivity is linked to this new technology through two distinct mechanisms: (i) the mere displacement of the older technology (vertically integrated producers) was responsible for a third of the increase in the industry's productivity, and (ii) increased competition...
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作者：Ottaviani, Marco; Sorensen, Peter Norman
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Copenhagen
摘要：This paper analyzes how asset prices in a binary market react to information when traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs. We show that the competitive equilibrium price underreacts to information when there is a bound to the amount of money traders are allowed to invest. Underreaction is more pronounced when prior beliefs are more heterogeneous. Even in the absence of exogenous bounds on the amount that traders can invest, prices underreact to information provided that traders become less ri...
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作者：Matejka, Filip; McKay, Alisdair
作者单位：Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Boston University
摘要：Individuals must often choose among discrete actions with imperfect information about their payoffs. Before choosing, they have an opportunity to study the payoffs, but doing so is costly. This creates new choices such as the number of and types of questions to ask. We model these situations using the rational inattention approach to information frictions. We find that the decision maker's optimal strategy results in choosing probabilistically in line with a generalized multinomial logit model...
