-
作者：Hajivassiliou, VA; McFadden, DL
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The method of simulated scores (MSS) is presented for estimating limited dependent variables models (LDV) with flexible correlation structure in the unobservables. We propose simulators that are continuous in the unknown parameter vectors, and hence standard optimization methods can be used to compute the MSS estimators that employ these simulators. The first continuous method relies on a recursive conditioning of the multivariate normal density through a Cholesky triangularization of its vari...
-
作者：Blundell, R; Duncan, A; Meghir, C
作者单位：University of London; University College London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; University College London; University of York - UK; University of York - UK
摘要：The 1980's tax reforms and the changing dispersion of wages offer one of the best opportunities yet to estimate labor supply effects. Nevertheless, changing sample composition, aggregate shocks, the changing composition of the tax paying population, and discontinuities in the tax system create serious identification and estimation problems. We develop grouping estimators that address these issues. Our results reveal positive and moderately sized wage elasticities. We: also find negative income...
-
作者：Browning, M; Chiappori, PA
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; McMaster University; University of Chicago
摘要：The neoclassical theory of demand applies to individuals, yet in empirical work it is usually taken as valid for households with many members. This paper explores what the theory of individuals implies for households that have more than one member. We make minimal assumptions about how the individual members of the household resolve conflicts. All we assume is that however decisions are made, outcomes are efficient. We refer to this as the collective setting. We show that in the collective set...
-
作者：Dekel, E; Lipman, BL; Rustichini, A
作者单位：Northwestern University; Western University (University of Western Ontario); Tilburg University
-
作者：Dufour, JM; Renault, E
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：Causality in the sense of Granger is typically defined in terms of predictibility of a vector of variables one period ahead. Recently, Lutkepohl (1993) proposed to define noncausality between two variables in terms of nonpredictibility at any number of periods ahead. When more than two vectors are considered (i.e., when the information set contains auxiliary variables), these two notions are not equivalent. In this paper, we first generalize the notion of causality by considering causality at ...
-
作者：Brown, BW; Newey, WK
作者单位：Rice University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
-
作者：Compte, O
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：This paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played, and in which players are allowed to communicate using public messages. Providing incentives for players to reveal their observations generates (revelation) constraints that, combined with signal imperfections, may be a source of inefficiencies. However, by delaying the revelation of their observations, players may economize on the cost of deterring deviations, and thereby avoi...
-
作者：Jackson, MO; Palfrey, TR
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We examine a simple bargaining setting, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other. We begin by characterizing efficiency in such a dynamic setting, and discuss how it differs from efficiency in a centralized static setting. We then study the allocations which can result in equilibrium when the matched buyers and sellers bargain through some extensive game form. We take an implementation approach? characterizing the possible allocation rules which result as t...
