作者：Wolinsky, A
作者单位：Northwestern University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：This paper examines an employment relation in which individual workers enjoy some bargaining power-vis-g-vis the firm although they are not unionized. The main elements of the situations studied here are that the employment contracts are non-binding across periods of production and that the firm has opportunities to replace workers. The paper analyzes a dynamic model in which the processes of contracting and recontracting between the firm and its workers are intertwined with the dynamic evolut...
作者：Biais, B; Martimort, D; Rochet, JC
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour
摘要：Consider strategic risk-neutral traders competing in schedules to supply liquidity to a risk-averse agent who is privately informed about the value of the asset and his hedging needs. Imperfect competition in this common value environment is analyzed as a multi-principal game in which liquidity suppliers offer trading mechanisms in a decentralized way. Each liquidity supplier behaves as a monopolist facing a residual demand curve resulting from the maximizing behavior of the informed agent and...
