-
作者：Athey, S
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper analyzes a class of games of incomplete information where each agent has private information about her own type, and the types are drawn from an atomless joint probability distribution. The main result establishes existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) under a condition we call the single crossing condition (SCC), roughly described as follows: whenever each opponent uses a nondecreasing strategy (in the sense that higher types choose higher actions), a player's best respo...
-
作者：Kamihigashi, T
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Kobe University
摘要：This paper studies necessity of transversality conditions for the continuous time, reduced form model. By generalizing Benveniste and Scheinkman's (1982) envelope condition and Michel's (1990) version of the squeezing argument, we show a generalization of Michel's (1990, Theorem 1) necessity result that does not assume concavity. The generalization enables us to generalize Ekeland and Scheinkman's (1986) result as well as to establish a new result that does not require the objective functional...
-
作者：Harris, C; Laibson, D
作者单位：University of London; King's College London; Harvard University
摘要：Laboratory and field studies of time preference find that discount rates are much greater in the short-run than in the long-run, Hyperbolic discount functions capture this property. This paper solves the decision problem of a hyperbolic consumer who faces stochastic income and a burrowing constraint. The paper uses the bounded variation calculus to derive the Hyperbolic Euler Relation, a natural generalization of the standard Exponential Euler Relation. The Hyperbolic Euler Relation implies th...
