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作者：Chernozhukov, V; Hansen, C
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Chicago
摘要：The ability of quantile regression models to characterize the heterogeneous impact of variables on different points of an outcome distribution makes them appealing in many economic applications. However, in observational studies, the variables of interest (e.g., education, prices) are often endogenous, making conventional quantile regression inconsistent and hence inappropriate for recovering the causal effects of these variables on the quantiles of economic outcomes. In order to address this ...
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作者：Rocheteau, G; Wright, R
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; Australian National University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first-order welfare losses. Under price taking, the...
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作者：Jackson, MO; Swinkels, JM
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions, including the first general existence result for double auctions. The set of equilibria is invariant to the tie-breaking rule. The model incorporates multiple unit demands, all standard pricing rules, reserve prices, entry costs, and stochastic demand and supply. Valuations can be correlated and asymmetrically distributed. For double auctions, we show further that at least one equilibrium i...
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作者：Andersen, TG; Bollerslev, T; Meddahi, N
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Duke University; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We develop general model-free adjustment procedures for the calculation of unbiased volatility loss functions based on practically feasible realized volatility benchmarks. The procedures, which exploit recent nonparametric asymptotic distributional results, are both easy-to-implement and highly accurate in empirically realistic situations. We also illustrate that properly accounting for the measurement errors in the volatility forecast evaluations reported in the existing literature can result...
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作者：Rigotti, L; Shannon, C
作者单位：Duke University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper considers a general equilibrium model in which the distinction between uncertainty and risk is formalized by assuming agents have incomplete preferences over state-contingent consumption bundles, as in Bewley (1986). Without completeness, individual decision making depends on a set of probability distributions over the state space. A bundle is preferred to another if and only if it has larger expected utility for all probabilities in this set. When preferences are complete this set ...
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作者：Feinberg, Y; Skrzypacz, A
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study a one-sided offers bargaining game in which the buyer has private information about the value of the object and the seller has private information about his beliefs about the buyer's valuation. We show that this uncertainty about uncertainties dramatically changes the set of outcomes. In particular, second order beliefs can lead to a delay in reaching agreement even when the seller makes frequent offers. We show that not all types of second order beliefs lead to a delay. When the buye...
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作者：Pinkse, J; Tan, GF
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Southern California
摘要：We study the monotonicity of the equilibrium bid with respect to the number of bidders n in affiliated private-value models of first-price sealed-bid auctions and prove the existence of a large class of such models in which the equilibrium bid function is not increasing in n. We moreover decompose the effect of a change in n on the bid level into a competition effect and an affiliation effect. The latter suggests to the winner of the auction that competition is less intense than she had though...
