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作者：Acemoglu, Daron
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper presents three sets of results about equilibrium bias of technology. First, I show that when the menu of technological possibilities only allows for factor-augmenting technologies, the increase in the supply of a factor induces technological change relatively biased toward that factor-meaning that the induced technological change increases the relative marginal product of the factor becoming more abundant. Moreover, this induced bias can be strong enough to make the relative margina...
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作者：Mikusheva, Anna
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The purpose of this paper is to provide theoretical justification for some existing methods for constructing confidence intervals for the sum of coefficients in autoregressive models. We show that the methods of Stock (1991), Andrews (1993), and Hansen (1999) provide asymptotically valid confidence intervals, whereas the subsampling method of Romano and Wolf (2001) does not. In addition, we generalize the three valid methods to a larger class of statistics. We also clarify the difference betwe...
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作者：Sannikov, Yuliy
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper investigates a new class of two-player games in continuous time, in which the players' observations of each other's actions are distorted by Brownian motions. These games are analogous to repeated games with imperfect monitoring in which the players take actions frequently. Using a differential equation, we find the set epsilon(r) of payoff pairs achievable by all public perfect equilibria of the continuous-time game, where r is the discount rate. The same differential equation allo...
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作者：Bajari, Patrick; Benkard, C. Lanier; Levin, Jonathan
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Stanford University
摘要：We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov perfect equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural parameters are estimated using the optimality conditions for equilibrium. The second step estimator is a simple simulated minimum distance estimator. The algorithm applies to a broad class of models, includin...
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作者：Chernozhukov, Victor; Hong, Han; Tamer, Elie
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper develops a framework for performing estimation and inference in econometric models with partial identification, focusing particularly on models characterized by moment inequalities and equalities. Applications of this framework include the analysis of game-theoretic models, revealed preference restrictions, regressions with missing and corrupted data, auction models, structural quantile regressions, and asset pricing models. Specifically, we provide estimators and confidence regions...
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作者：Zame, William R.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper takes steps toward integrating firm theory in the spirit of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Grossman and Hart (1986), contract theory in the spirit of Holmstrom (1979), and general equilibrium theory in the spirit of Arrow and Debreu (1954) and McKenzie ( 1959). In the model presented here, the set of firms that form and the contractual arrangements that appear, the assignments of agents to firms, the prices faced by firms for inputs and outputs, and the incentives to agents are all ...
