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作者：Feinberg, Yossi; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Toronto
摘要：We consider a cross-calibration test of predictions by multiple potential experts in a stochastic environment. This test checks whether each expert is calibrated conditional on the predictions made by other experts. We show that this test is good in the sense that a true expert-one informed of the true distribution of the process-is guaranteed to pass the test no matter what the other potential experts do, and false experts will fail the test on all but a small (category I) set of true distrib...
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作者：Athey, Susan; Bagwell, Kyle
作者单位：Harvard University; Columbia University; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We consider a dynamic Bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period. Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first-order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms, emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game. In general, there is a trade-off between productive efficiency, whereby the low-cost firm serves the mar...
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作者：Graham, Bryan S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper proposes a new method for identifying social interactions using conditional variance restrictions. The method provides a consistent estimate of the social multiplier when social interactions take the linear-in-means form (Manski (1993)). When social interactions are not of the linear-in-means form, the estimator, under certain conditions, continues to form the basis of a consistent test of the no social interactions null with correct large sample size. The methods are illustrated us...
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作者：Andersen, Steffen; Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten I.; Rutstrom, E. Elisabet
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; Copenhagen Business School; State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida; Durham University
摘要：We design experiments to jointly elicit risk and time preferences for the adult Danish population. Since subjects are generally risk averse, we find that joint elicitation provides estimates of discount rates that are significantly lower than those found in previous studies and more in line with what would be considered as a priori reasonable rates. The statistical specification relies on a theoretical framework that involves a latent trade-off between long-run optimization and short-run tempt...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Weinstein, Jonathan
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We show that a simple reputation-style test can always identify which of two experts is informed about the true distribution. The test presumes no prior knowledge of the true distribution, achieves any desired degree of precision in some fixed finite time, and does not use counterfactual predictions. Our analysis capitalizes on a result of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) on the rate of convergence of supermartingales. We use our setup to shed some light on the apparent paradox that a strategically...
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作者：Evans, Robert
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper studies a general model of holdup in a setting encompassing the models of Segal (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) among others. It is shown that if renegotiation is modeled as an infinite-horizon noncooperative bargaining game, then, with a simple initial contract, an efficient equilibrium will generally exist. The contract is robust in the sense that it does not depend on fine details of the model. The contract gives authority to one party to set the terms of trade and gives the oth...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Golosov, Michael; Tsyvinski, Aleh
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University
摘要：We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self-interested politicians who control the allocation of resources in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model. Citizens discipline politicians using elections. We show that the need to provide incentives to the politician in power creates political economy distortions in the structure of production, which resemble aggregate tax distortions. We provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in ...
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作者：Hurvich, Clifford M.; Moulines, Eric; Soulier, Philippe
作者单位：New York University; IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; IMT Atlantique; Universite Paris Nanterre
