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作者：Eeckhout, Jan; Kircher, Philipp
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Pompeu Fabra University; University of Oxford
摘要：We investigate the role of search frictions in markets with price competition and how it leads to sorting of heterogeneous agents. There are two aspects of value creation: the match value when two agents actually trade and the probability of trading governed by the search technology. We show that positive assortative matching obtains when complementarities in the former outweigh complementarities in the latter. This happens if and only if the match-value function is root-supermodular, that is,...
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作者：Bartolucci, Francesco; Nigro, Valentina
作者单位：University of Perugia; University of Rome Tor Vergata
摘要：A model for binary panel data is introduced which allows for state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity beyond the effect of available covariates. The model is of quadratic exponential type and its structure closely resembles that of the dynamic logit model. However, it has the advantage of being easily estimable via conditional likelihood with at least two observations (further to an initial observation) and even in the presence of time dummies among the regressors.
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作者：Pesendorfer, Martin; Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Recursive procedures which are based on iterating on the best response mapping have difficulties converging to all equilibria in multi-player games. We illustrate these difficulties by revisiting the asymptotic properties of the iterative nested pseudo maximum likelihood method for estimating dynamic games introduced by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). An example shows that the iterative method may not be consistent.
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作者：Winschel, Viktor; Kraetzig, Markus
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We present a comprehensive framework for Bayesian estimation of structural nonlinear dynamic economic models on sparse grids to overcome the curse of dimensionality for approximations. We apply sparse grids to a global polynomial approximation of the model solution, to the quadrature of integrals arising as rational expectations, and to three new nonlinear state space filters which speed up the sequential importance resampling particle filter. The posterior of the structural parameters is esti...
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作者：Ahn, David S.; Ergin, Haluk
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：The subjective likelihood of a contingency often depends on the manner in which it is described to the decision maker. To accommodate this dependence, we introduce a model of decision making under uncertainty that takes as primitive a family of preferences indexed by partitions of the state space. Each partition corresponds to a description of the state space. We characterize the following partition-dependent expected utility representation. The decision maker has a nonadditive set function nu...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent-proposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms-individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity-are essential to our analysis. An allocation rule is the agent-proposing deferred acceptance rule for some acceptant substitutable priority if and only if it satisfies non-wastefulness and individually ration...
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作者：Bugni, Federico A.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper introduces a novel bootstrap procedure to perform inference in a wide class of partially identified econometric models. We consider econometric models defined by finitely many weak moment inequalities,2 which encompass many applications of economic interest. The objective of our inferential procedure is to cover the identified set with a prespecified probability.3 We compare our bootstrap procedure, a competing asymptotic approximation, and subsampling procedures in terms of the rat...
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作者：Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We consider a class of mechanism games in which there are multiple principals and three or more agents. For a mechanism game in this class, a sort of folk theorem holds: there is a threshold value for each of the principals such that an allocation is achieved at a pure-strategy sequential equilibrium of the game if and only if (i) it is incentive compatible and (ii) it attains an expected utility for each principal that is greater than or equal to the threshold value for the principal.
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作者：Besanko, David; Doraszelski, Ulrich; Kryukov, Yaroslav; Satterthwaite, Mark
作者单位：Northwestern University; Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting are empirically important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. We show that forgetting does not simply negate learning. Rather, they are distinct economic forces that interact in subtle ways to produce a great variety of pricing behaviors and industry dynamics. In particular, a model with learni...
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作者：Chesher, Andrew
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：Single equation instrumental variable models for discrete outcomes are shown to be set identifying, not point identifying, for the structural functions that deliver the values of the discrete outcome. Bounds on identified sets are derived for a general nonparametric model and sharp set identification is demonstrated in the binary outcome case. Point identification is typically not achieved by imposing parametric restrictions. The extent of an identified set varies with the strength and support...
