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作者：Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：This paper establishes existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic games with noisea component of the state that is nonatomically distributed and not directly affected by the previous period's state and actions. Noise may be simply a payoff-irrelevant public randomization device, delivering known results on the existence of correlated equilibrium as a special case. More generally, noise can take the form of shocks that enter into players' stage payoffs and the tr...
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作者：Kirkegaard, Rene
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：I propose a new mechanism design approach to the problem of ranking standard auctions with two heterogeneous bidders. A key feature of the approach is that it may be possible to rank two auctions even if neither dominates the other for all combinations of types. The approach simplifies the analysis and unifies results in the existing literature. Roughly speaking, the first-price auction is more profitable than the second-price auction when the strong bidder's distribution is flatter and more d...
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作者：Graham, Bryan S.; Powell, James L.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：In this paper we study identification and estimation of a correlated random coefficients (CRC) panel data model. The outcome of interest varies linearly with a vector of endogenous regressors. The coefficients on these regressors are heterogenous across units and may covary with them. We consider the average partial effect (APE) of a small change in the regressor vector on the outcome (cf. Chamberlain (1984), Wooldridge (2005a)). Chamberlain (1992) calculated the semiparametric efficiency boun...
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作者：Carvajal, Andres; Rostek, Marzena; Weretka, Marek
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper examines the incentives offered by frictionless markets to innovate asset-backed securities by owners who maximize the assets' values. Assuming identical preferences across investors with heterogeneous risk-sharing needs, we characterize economies in which competition provides insufficient incentives to innovate so that, in equilibrium, financial markets are incomplete in all (pure strategy) equilibria, even when innovation is essentially costless. Thus, value maximization does not ...
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作者：Su, Che-Lin; Judd, Kenneth L.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Estimating structural models is often viewed as computationally difficult, an impression partly due to a focus on the nested fixed-point (NFXP) approach. We propose a new constrained optimization approach for structural estimation. We show that our approach and the NFXP algorithm solve the same estimation problem, and yield the same estimates. Computationally, our approach can have speed advantages because we do not repeatedly solve the structural equation at each guess of structural parameter...
