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作者：Buchinsky, Moshe; Gotlibovski, Chemi; Lifshitz, Osnat
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Academic College of Tel Aviv Yaffo
摘要：We develop and estimate a comprehensive dynamic programming (DP) model for the joint decisions of residential location, employment location, occupational choices, and labor market outcomes. We use data on immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU). We provide an extensive empirical evaluation of policies that have been designed to affect the residential and employment location decisions of the migrant population. The results shed new, and important, light on several issues regarding this gr...
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作者：Karaivanov, Alexander; Townsend, Robert M.
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We formulate and solve a range of dynamic models of constrained credit/insurance that allow for moral hazard and limited commitment. We compare them to full insurance and exogenously incomplete financial regimes (autarky, saving only, borrowing and lending in a single asset). We develop computational methods based on mechanism design, linear programming, and maximum likelihood to estimate, compare, and statistically test these alternative dynamic models with financial/information constraints. ...
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作者：Phillips, Peter C. B.
作者单位：Yale University; University of Auckland; Singapore Management University; University of Southampton
摘要：Local to unity limit theory is used in applications to construct confidence intervals (CIs) for autoregressive roots through inversion of a unit root test (Stock (1991)). Such CIs are asymptotically valid when the true model has an autoregressive root that is local to unity (rho = 1 + c/n), but are shown here to be invalid at the limits of the domain of definition of the localizing coefficient c because of a failure in tightness and the escape of probability mass. Failure at the boundary impli...
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作者：Heap, Shaun Hargreaves; Rojo Arjona, David; Sugden, Robert
作者单位：University of London; King's College London; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of East Anglia
摘要：We test the portability of level-0 assumptions in level-k theory in an experimental investigation of behavior in Coordination, Discoordination, and Hide and Seek games with common, non-neutral frames. Assuming that level-0 behavior depends only on the frame, we derive hypotheses that are independent of prior assumptions about salience. Those hypotheses are not confirmed. Our findings contrast with previous research which has fitted parameterized level-k models to Hide and Seek data. We show th...
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作者：Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frederic; Perez-Richet, Eduardo
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information revelation. We consider Bayesian games augmented by a pre-play communication phase in which announcements are made publicly. We first characterize the augmented games in which there exists a fully revealing sequential equilibrium with extremal beliefs (i.e., any deviation is attributed to a single type of the deviator). Next, we define a class of games for which existence of a fully revealing equili...
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作者：Hinnerich, Bjorn Tyrefors; Pettersson-Lidbom, Per
作者单位：Stockholm University
摘要：In this paper, we compare how two different types of political regimes-direct versus representative democracy-redistribute income toward the relatively poor segments of society after the introduction of universal and equal suffrage. Swedish local governments are used as a testing ground since this setting offers a number of attractive features for a credible impact evaluation. Most importantly, we exploit the existence of a population threshold, which partly determined a local government's cho...
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作者：Golosov, Mikhail; Lorenzoni, Guido; Tsyvinski, Aleh
作者单位：Princeton University; Northwestern University; Yale University
摘要：The paper studies how asset prices are determined in a decentralized market with asymmetric information about asset values. We consider an economy in which a large number of agents trade two assets in bilateral meetings. A fraction of the agents has private information about the asset values. We show that, over time, uninformed agents can elicit information from their trading partners by making small offers. This form of experimentation allows the uninformed agents to acquire information as lo...
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作者：Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco
作者单位：University of St Andrews; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：We model a boundedly rational agent who suffers from limited attention. The agent considers each feasible alternative with a given (unobservable) probability, the attention parameter, and then chooses the alternative that maximizes a preference relation within the set of considered alternatives. We show that this random choice rule is the only one for which the impact of removing an alternative on the choice probability of any other alternative is asymmetric and menu independent. Both the pref...
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作者：Dix-Carneiro, Rafael
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper estimates a structural dynamic equilibrium model of the Brazilian labor market in order to study trade-induced transitional dynamics. The model features a multi-sector economy with overlapping generations, heterogeneous workers, endogenous accumulation of sector-specific experience, and costly switching of sectors. The model's estimates yield median costs of mobility ranging from 1.4 to 2.7 times annual average wages, but a high dispersion of these costs across the population. In ad...
