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作者：Honore, Bo E.; Hu, Luojia
作者单位：Princeton University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：The bootstrap is a convenient tool for calculating standard errors of the parameter estimates of complicated econometric models. Unfortunately, the fact that these models are complicated often makes the bootstrap extremely slow or even practically infeasible. This paper proposes an alternative to the bootstrap that relies only on the estimation of one-dimensional parameters. We introduce the idea in the context of M and GMM estimators. A modification of the approach can be used to estimate the...
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作者：Calford, Evan; Oprea, Ryan
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：The theory of continuous time games (Simon and Stinchcombe (1989), Bergin and MacLeod (1993)) shows that continuous time interactions can generate very different equilibrium behavior than conventional discrete time interactions. We introduce new laboratory methods that allow us to eliminate natural inertia in subjects' decisions in continuous time experiments, thereby satisfying critical premises of the theory and enabling a first-time direct test. Applying these new methods to a simple timing...
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作者：Hagedorn, Marcus; Law, Tzuo Hann; Manovskii, Iourii
作者单位：University of Oslo; Boston College; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We assess the empirical content of equilibrium models of labor market sorting based on unobserved (to economists) characteristics. In particular, we show theoretically that all parameters of the classic model of sorting based on absolute advantage in Becker (1973) with search frictions can be nonparametrically identified using only matched employer-employee data on wages and labor market transitions. In particular, these data are sufficient to nonparametrically estimate the output of any indiv...
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作者：Bogomolnaia, Anna; Moulin, Herve; Sandomirskiy, Fedor; Yanovskaya, Elena
作者单位：University of Glasgow; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：A mixed manna contains goods (that everyone likes) and bads (that everyone dislikes), as well as items that are goods to some agents, but bads or satiated to others. If all items are goods and utility functions are homogeneous of degree 1 and concave (and monotone), the competitive division maximizes the Nash product of utilities (Gale-Eisenberg): hence it is welfarist (determined by the set of feasible utility profiles), unique, continuous, and easy to compute. We show that the competitive di...
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作者：Ergin, Haluk; Sonmez, Tayfun; Unver, M. Utku
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston College; Koc University
摘要：Owing to the worldwide shortage of deceased-donor organs for transplantation, living donations have become a significant source of transplant organs. However, not all willing donors can donate to their intended recipients because of medical incompatibilities. These incompatibilities can be overcome by an exchange of donors between patients. For kidneys, such exchanges have become widespread in the last decade with the introduction of optimization and market design techniques to kidney exchange...
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作者：Peski, Marcin; Toikka, Juuso
作者单位：University of Toronto; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We develop a theory of how the value of an agent's information advantage depends on the persistence of information. We focus on strategic situations with strict conflict of interest, formalized as stochastic zero-sum games where only one of the players observes the state that evolves according to a Markov operator. Operator Q is said to be better for the informed player than operator P if the value of the game under Q is higher than under P regardless of the stage game. We show that this defin...
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作者：Gospodinov, Nikolay; Kan, Raymond; Robotti, Cesare
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; University of Toronto; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：This note studies some seemingly anomalous results that arise in possibly misspecified, reduced-rank linear asset-pricing models estimated by the continuously updated generalized method of moments. When a spurious factor (that is, a factor that is uncorrelated with the returns on the test assets) is present, the test for correct model specification has asymptotic power that is equal to the nominal size. In other words, applied researchers will erroneously conclude that the model is correctly s...
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作者：Basu, Susanto; Bundick, Brent
作者单位：Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Kansas City
摘要：Can increased uncertainty about the future cause a contraction in output and its components? An identified uncertainty shock in the data causes significant declines in output, consumption, investment, and hours worked. Standard general-equilibrium models with flexible prices cannot reproduce this comovement. However, uncertainty shocks can easily generate comovement with countercyclical markups through sticky prices. Monetary policy plays a key role in offsetting the negative impact of uncerta...
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作者：Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy; Li, Ming
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Kyiv School of Economics; University of St Andrews; Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments...
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作者：Galperti, Simone; Strulovici, Bruno
作者单位：University of San Diego; Northwestern University
摘要：Modeling intergenerational altruism is crucial to evaluate the long-term consequences of current decisions, and requires a set of principles guiding such altruism. We axiomatically develop a theory of pure, direct altruism: Altruism is pure if it concerns the total utility (rather than the mere consumption utility) of future generations, and direct if it directly incorporates the utility of all future generations. Our axioms deliver a new class of altruistic, forward-looking preferences, whose...
