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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico; Lambert, Nicolas S.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study preferences estimated from finite choice experiments and provide sufficient conditions for convergence to a unique underlying true preference. Our conditions are weak and, therefore, valid in a wide range of economic environments. We develop applications to expected utility theory, choice over consumption bundles, and menu choice. Our framework unifies the revealed preference tradition with models that allow for errors.
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作者：Mrazova, Monika; Neary, J. Peter; Parenti, Mathieu
作者单位：University of Geneva; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Oxford; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We characterize the relationship between the distributions of two variables linked by a structural model. We then show that, in models of heterogeneous firms in monopolistic competition, this relationship implies a new demand function that we call CREMR (Constant Revenue Elasticity of Marginal Revenue). This demand function is the only one that is consistent with productivity and sales distributions having the same form (whether Pareto, lognormal, or Frechet) in the cross section, and it is ne...
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作者：Narita, Yusuke
作者单位：Yale University; Yale University
摘要：This note points out that the proof of Theorem 1, the main theorem, in Ergin (2002) needs two corrections. We provide two counterexamples to Ergin's (2002) proof and show that the theorem holds as it is by providing an alternative proof.
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作者：Gossner, Olivier; Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Zurich; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; University of Toronto
摘要：We study the impact of manipulating the attention of a decision-maker who learns sequentially about a number of items before making a choice. Under natural assumptions on the decision-maker's strategy, directing attention toward one item increases its likelihood of being chosen regardless of its value. This result applies when the decision-maker can reject all items in favor of an outside option with known value; if no outside option is available, the direction of the effect of manipulation de...
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作者：Saleh, Mohamed; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A ruler who does not identify with a social group, whether on religious, ethnic, cultural, or socioeconomic grounds, is confronted with a trade-off between taking advantage of the out-group population's eagerness to maintain its identity and inducing it to comply (conversion, quitting, exodus, or any other way to accommodate the ruler's own identity). This paper first nests economists' extraction model, in which rulers are revenue-maximizers, within a more general identity-based model, in whic...
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作者：Kleiner, Andreas; Moldovanu, Benny; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Bonn; Yale University
摘要：We characterize the set of extreme points of monotonic functions that are either majorized by a given function f or themselves majorize f and show that these extreme points play a crucial role in many economic design problems. Our main results show that each extreme point is uniquely characterized by a countable collection of intervals. Outside these intervals the extreme point equals the original function f and inside the function is constant. Further consistency conditions need to be satisfi...
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作者：Kono, Haruki; Kandori, Michihiro
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：In their analysis of strategic information transmission, Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel (1982) showed the existence of partition equilibria (Theorem 1). Although the theorem itself is correct, the proof contains some incorrect statements. We present a counter-example and provide a correct version of the proof.
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作者：Dworczak, Piotr; Kominers, Scott Duke; Akbarpour, Mohammad
作者单位：Northwestern University; Harvard University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
摘要：Policymakers frequently use price regulations as a response to inequality in the markets they control. In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of such policies from the perspective of mechanism design. We study a buyer-seller market in which agents have private information about both their valuations for an indivisible object and their marginal utilities for money. The planner seeks a mechanism that maximizes agents' total utilities, subject to incentive and market-clearing constraints...
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作者：Bagwell, Kyle; Staiger, Robert W.; Yurukoglu, Ali
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Dartmouth College; Stanford University
摘要：We develop a model of international tariff negotiations to study the design of the institutional rules of the GATT/WTO. A key principle of the GATT/WTO is its most-favored-nation (MFN) requirement of nondiscrimination, a principle that has long been criticized for inviting free-riding behavior. We embed a multisector model of international trade into a model of interconnected bilateral negotiations over tariffs and assess the value of the MFN principle. Using 1990 trade flows and tariff outcom...
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作者：Amador, Manuel; Phelan, Christopher
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper presents a continuous-time model of sovereign debt. In it, a relatively impatient sovereign government's hidden type switches back and forth between a commitment type, which cannot default, and an opportunistic type, which can, and where we assume outside lenders have particular beliefs regarding how a commitment type should borrow for any given level of debt and bond price. In any Markov equilibrium, the opportunistic type mimics the commitment type when borrowing, revealing its ty...
