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作者：Gieczewski, German
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：This paper models the evolution of organizations that allow free entry and exit of members, such as cities and trade unions. In each period, current members choose a policy for the organization. Policy changes attract newcomers and drive away dissatisfied members, altering the set of future policymakers. The resulting feedback effects take the organization down a slippery slope that converges to a myopically stable policy, even if the agents are forward-looking, but convergence becomes slower ...
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作者：Agarwal, Nikhil; Ashlagi, Itai; Rees, Michael A.; Somaini, Paulo; Waldinger, Daniel
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; University System of Ohio; University of Toledo; Stanford University; New York University
摘要：Waitlists are often used to ration scarce resources, but the trade-offs in designing these mechanisms depend on agents' preferences. We study equilibrium allocations under alternative designs for the deceased donor kidney waitlist. We model the decision to accept an organ or wait for a preferable one as an optimal stopping problem and estimate preferences using administrative data from the New York City area. Our estimates show that while some kidney types are desirable for all patients, there...
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作者：Bohren, J. Aislinn; Hauser, Daniel N.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Aalto University
摘要：This paper develops a general framework to study how misinterpreting information impacts learning. Our main result is a simple criterion to characterize long-run beliefs based on the underlying form of misspecification. We present this characterization in the context of social learning, then highlight how it applies to other learning environments, including individual learning. A key contribution is that our characterization applies to settings with model heterogeneity and provides conditions ...
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作者：Eeckhout, Jan; Kircher, Philipp; Lafuente, Cristina; Macci, Gabriele
作者单位：ICREA; European University Institute; University of Edinburgh
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作者：Hahn, Jinyong; Liao, Zhipeng
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Asymptotic justification of the bootstrap often takes the form of weak convergence of the bootstrap distribution to some limit distribution. Theoretical literature recognized that the weak convergence does not imply consistency of the bootstrap second moment or the bootstrap variance as an estimator of the asymptotic variance, but such concern is not always reflected in the applied practice. We bridge the gap between the theory and practice by showing that such common bootstrap based standard ...
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作者：Grossman, Gene M.; McCalman, Phillip; Staiger, Robert W.
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Melbourne; Dartmouth College
摘要：What incentives do governments have to negotiate trade agreements that constrain their domestic regulatory policies? We study a model in which firms design products to appeal to local consumer tastes, but their fixed costs increase with the difference between versions of their product destined for different markets. In this setting, firms' profit-maximizing choices of product attributes are globally optimal in the absence of consumption externalities, but national governments have unilateral i...
