POLICY PERSISTENCE AND DRIFT IN ORGANIZATIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gieczewski, German
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA15873
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 251-279
• 关键词: dynamics

摘要

This paper models the evolution of organizations that allow free entry and exit of members, such as cities and trade unions. In each period, current members choose a policy for the organization. Policy changes attract newcomers and drive away dissatisfied members, altering the set of future policymakers. The resulting feedback effects take the organization down a slippery slope that converges to a myopically stable policy, even if the agents are forward-looking, but convergence becomes slower the more patient they are. The model yields a tractable characterization of the steady state and the transition dynamics. The analysis is also extended to situations in which the organization can exclude members, such as enfranchisement and immigration.