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作者：Carnehl, Christoph; Schneider, Johannes
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：Is more novel research always desirable? We develop a model in which knowledge shapes society's policies and guides the search for discoveries. Researchers select a question and how intensely to study it. The novelty of a question determines both the value and difficulty of discovering its answer. We show that the benefits of discoveries are nonmonotone in novelty. Knowledge expands endogenously step-by-step over time. Through a dynamic externality, moonshots-research on questions more novel t...
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作者：Chen, Yiting; Zhong, Songfa
作者单位：Lingnan University; National University of Singapore; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We conduct a series of experiments and document a robust behavioral pattern whereby people behave more morally in uncertain environments than degenerate deterministic ones. We show that this pattern is weakened when the moral implication of behavior is diminished or when uncertainty pertains to others rather than oneself. These findings are incompatible with standard models that respect dominance. We propose a mechanism based on the anxiety aspect of uncertain environments whereby people act m...
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作者：Arias, Jonas E.; Rubio-Ramirez, Juan F.; Waggoner, Daniel F.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Emory University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
摘要：There has been a call for caution regarding the standard procedure for Bayesian inference in set-identified structural vector autoregressions on the grounds that the common practice of using a uniform prior over the set of orthogonal matrices induces a non-uniform prior for individual impulse responses or other quantities of interest. This paper challenges this call by formally showing that when the focus is on joint inference, the uniform prior over the set of orthogonal matrices is not only ...
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作者：Ely, Jeffrey C.; Georgiadis, George; Rayo, Luis
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the joint design of dynamic incentives and performance feedback for an environment with a coarse (all-or-nothing) measure of performance, and show that hiding information from the agent can be an optimal way to motivate effort. Using a novel approach to incentive compatibility, we derive a two-phase solution that begins with a silent phase where the agent is given no feedback and is asked to work non-stop, and ends with a full-transparency phase where the agent stops working as soon a...
