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作者：Barlevy, Gadi
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：This paper shows how record-value theory, a branch of statistics that deals with the timing and magnitude of extreme values in sequences of random variables, can be used to recover features of the wage offer distribution in conventional search models. Using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) wage data, I show that the data are not compatible with specifications for the offer distribution characterized by extreme negative skewness. In addition, I show that my approach can be used to c...
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作者：Kuran, Timur; Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：Duke University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：A community's culture is defined by the preferences and equilibrium behaviours of its members. Contacts among communities alter individual cultures through two interrelated mechanisms: behavioural adaptations driven by pay-offs to coordination, and preference changes shaped by socialization and self-persuasion. This paper explores the workings of these mechanisms through a model of cultural integration in which preferences and behaviours vary continuously. It identifies a broad set of conditio...
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作者：Caruana, Guillermo; Einav, Liran
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Commitment is typically modelled by assigning to one of the players the ability to take an initial binding action. The weakness of this approach is that the fundamental question of who has the opportunity to commit cannot be addressed, as it is assumed. This paper presents a framework in which commitment power arises endogenously from the fundamentals of the model. We construct a finite dynamic game in which players are given the option to change their minds as often as they wish, but pay a sw...
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作者：Cabrales, Antonio; Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Pavoni, Nicola
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; ICREA; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study the earning structure and the equilibrium assignment of workers to firms in a model in which workers have social preferences, and skills are perfectly substitutable in production. Firms offer long-term contracts, and we allow for frictions in the labour market in the form of mobility costs. The model delivers specific predictions about the nature of worker flows, about the characteristics of workplace skill segregation, and about wage dispersion both within and across firms. We show t...
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作者：Alonso, Ricardo; Matouschek, Niko
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Southern California
摘要：We analyse the design of decision rules by a principal who faces an informed but biased agent and who is unable to commit to contingent transfers. The contracting problem reduces to a delegation problem in which the principal commits to a set of decisions from which the agent chooses his preferred one. We characterize the optimal delegation set and perform comparative statics on the principal's willingness to delegate and the agent's discretion. We also provide conditions for interval delegati...
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作者：Goldstein, Itay; Guembel, Alexander
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：It is commonly believed that prices in secondary financial markets play an important allocational role because they contain information that facilitates the efficient allocation of resources. This paper identifies a limitation inherent in this role of prices. It shows that the presence of a feedback effect from the financial market to the real value of a firm creates an incentive for an uninformed trader to sell the firm's stock. When this happens the informativeness of the stock price decreas...
