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作者：He, Zhigu; Krishnamurthy, Arvind
作者单位：University of Chicago; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a model in which the capital of the intermediary sector plays a critical role in determining asset prices. The model is cast within a dynamic general equilibrium economy, and the role for intermediation is derived endogenously based on optimal contracting considerations. Low intermediary capital reduces the risk-bearing capacity of the marginal investor. We show how this force helps to explain patterns during financial crises. The model replicates the observed rise during crises in ...
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作者：Brown, Meta; Scholz, John Karl; Seshadri, Ananth
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We discuss a simple model in which parents and children make investments in the children's education and investments for other purposes and parents can transfer cash to their children. We show that for an identifiable set of parent-child pairs, parents will rationally underinvest in their child's education. For these parent-child pairs, additional financial aid will increase educational attainment. The model highlights an important feature of higher education finance, the expected family contr...
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作者：Cespa, Giovanni; Vives, Xavier
作者单位：City St Georges, University of London
摘要：We investigate the dynamics of prices, information, and expectations in a competitive, noisy, dynamic asset pricing equilibrium model with long-term investors. We argue that the fact that prices can score worse or better than consensus opinion in predicting the fundamentals is a product of endogenous short-term speculation. For a given positive level of residual pay-off uncertainty, if liquidity trades display low persistence, rational investors act like market makers and accommodate the order...
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作者：Farhi, Emmanuel; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Harvard University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper analyses the possibility and the consequences of rational bubbles in a dynamic economy where financially constrained firms demand and supply liquidity. Bubbles are more likely to emerge, the scarcer the supply of outside liquidity and the more limited the pledgeability of corporate income; they crowd investment in (out) when liquidity is abundant (scarce). We analyse extensions with firm heterogeneity and stochastic bubbles.
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作者：Crozet, Matthieu; Head, Keith; Mayer, Thierry
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of British Columbia
摘要：Empirical investigation of the quality interpretation of the Melitz (2003) model of firm heterogeneity and trade has been limited by the lack of direct data on quality. This paper matches firm-level export data with expert assessments of the quality of champagne producers to estimate the key parameters of that model. Quality monotonically increases firm-level prices, the probability of market entry, and export values. The estimated model-which calibrates the relative importance of firm-level q...
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作者：Waldinger, Fabian
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：This paper analyses peer effects among university scientists. Specifically, it investigates whether the quality and the number of peers affect the productivity of researchers in physics, chemistry, and mathematics. The usual endogeneity problems related to estimating peer effects are addressed by using the dismissal of scientists by the Nazi government in 1933 as a source of exogenous variation in the peer group of scientists staying in Germany. To investigate localized peer effects, I constru...
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作者：Miller, David A.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：The game-theoretic literature on collusion has been hard pressed to explain why a cartel should engage in price wars, without resorting to either impatience, symmetry restrictions, inability to communicate, or failure to optimize. This paper introduces a new explanation that relies on none of these assumptions: if the cartel's member firms have private information about their costs, price wars can be optimal in the face of complexity. Specifically, equilibria that are robust to pay-off irrelev...
