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作者：Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights are reflected by the behaviour of subjects in the laboratory and to what extent deviations from standard theory can be explained by social preferences. Investigating settings with both exogenous and endogenous information structures, we find that agency theo...
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作者：Feigenberg, Benjamin; Field, Erica; Pande, Rohini
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Duke University; Harvard University
摘要：Microfinance clients were randomly assigned to repayment groups that met either weekly or monthly during their first loan cycle, and then graduated to identical meeting frequency for their second loan. Long-run survey data and a follow-up public goods experiment reveal that clients initially assigned to weekly groups interact more often and exhibit a higher willingness to pool risk with group members from their first loan cycle nearly 2 years after the experiment. They were also three times le...
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作者：Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier; Jeanne, Olivier
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：The textbook neoclassical growth model predicts that countries with faster productivity growth should invest more and attract more foreign capital. We show that the allocation of capital flows across developing countries is the opposite of this prediction: capital does not flow more to countries that invest and grow more. We call this puzzle the allocation puzzle. Using a wedge analysis, we find that the pattern of capital flows is driven by national saving: the allocation puzzle is a saving p...
