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作者：Dustmann, Christian; Frattini, Tommaso; Preston, Ian P.
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Milan
摘要：This paper analyses the effect immigration has on the wages of native workers. Unlike most previous work, we estimate wage effects along the distribution of native wages. We derive a flexible empirical strategy that does not rely on pre-allocating immigrants to particular skill groups. In our empirical analysis, we demonstrate that immigrants downgrade considerably upon arrival. As for the effects on native wages, we find a pattern of effects whereby immigration depresses wages below the 20th ...
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作者：Aimone, Jason A.; Iannaccone, Laurence R.; Makowsky, Michael D.; Rubin, Jared
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Baylor University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：Sacrifice is widely believed to enhance cooperation in churches, communes, gangs, clans, military units, and many other groups. We find that sacrifice can also work in the lab, apart from special ideologies, identities, or interactions. Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment. This leads to both endogenous sorting (because free-riders tend to reject the reduced-rate option) and substitution (...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU)
摘要：Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence politicians through non-electoral means. In weakly institutionalized polities where such non-electoral influences, particularly by the better organized elite, are a major concern, voters may prefer a poli...
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作者：Burks, Stephen V.; Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Goette, Lorenz; Rustichini, Aldo
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Morris; Middlebury College; University of Lausanne; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Evidence from both psychology and economics indicates that individuals give statements that appear to overestimate their ability compared to that of others. We test three theories that predict such relative overconfidence. The first theory argues that overconfidence can be generated by Bayesian updating from a common prior and truthful statements if individuals do not know their true type. The second theory suggests that self-image concerns asymmetrically affect the choice to receive new infor...
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作者：Moscarini, Giuseppe; Postel-Vinay, Fabien
作者单位：Yale University; University of Bristol
摘要：We study equilibrium wage and employment dynamics in a class of popular search models with wage posting, in the presence of aggregate productivity shocks. Firms offer and commit to (Markov) contracts, which specify a wage contingent on all payoff-relevant states, but must pay equally all of their workers, who have limited commitment and are free to quit at any time. We find sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a stochastic search equilibrium in such contracts, which is Ran...
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作者：Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights are reflected by the behaviour of subjects in the laboratory and to what extent deviations from standard theory can be explained by social preferences. Investigating settings with both exogenous and endogenous information structures, we find that agency theo...
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作者：Feigenberg, Benjamin; Field, Erica; Pande, Rohini
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Duke University; Harvard University
摘要：Microfinance clients were randomly assigned to repayment groups that met either weekly or monthly during their first loan cycle, and then graduated to identical meeting frequency for their second loan. Long-run survey data and a follow-up public goods experiment reveal that clients initially assigned to weekly groups interact more often and exhibit a higher willingness to pool risk with group members from their first loan cycle nearly 2 years after the experiment. They were also three times le...
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作者：Costinot, Arnaud; Vogel, Jonathan; Wang, Su
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：This article develops an elementary theory of global supply chains. We consider a world economy with an arbitrary number of countries, one factor of production, a continuum of intermediate goods and one final good. Production of the final good is sequential and subject to mistakes. In the unique free trade equilibrium, countries with lower probabilities of making mistakes at all stages specialize in later stages of production. Using this simple theoretical framework, we offer a first look at h...
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作者：Kapicka, Marek
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：This article studies efficient allocations in a dynamic private information economy with a continuum of idiosyncratic shocks that are persistent. I develop a first-order approach for this environment and show that the problem has a simple recursive structure that relies on only a small number of state variables, making the problem tractable. I find sufficient conditions that guarantee that the first-order approach is valid. To illustrate the first-order approach I numerically compute the effic...
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作者：Rohner, Dominic; Thoenig, Mathias; Zilibotti, Fabrizio
作者单位：University of Lausanne; University of Zurich
摘要：We construct a theory of persistent civil conflicts, where persistence is driven by the endogenous dynamics of inter-ethnic trust and trade. In times of peace, agents belonging to two groups are randomly matched to trade bilaterally. Trade hinges on trust and cooperation. The onset of conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to cooperate, harming future trust and trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time. The theory predicts that civil wa...
