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作者:Colombo, Luca; Femminis, Gianluca; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位:Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; Northwestern University
摘要:We study information acquisition in a flexible framework with strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions and a rich set of externalities that are responsible for possible wedges between the equilibrium and the efficient acquisition of information. First, we relate the (in)efficiency in the acquisition of information to the (in)efficiency in the use of information and explain why efficiency in the use is no guarantee of efficiency in the acquisition. Next, we show how the acquisit...
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作者:Biais, Bruno; Hombert, Johan; Weill, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位:Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:Information collection and processing in financial institutions is challenging. This can delay the observation by traders of the exact capital charges and constraints of their institution. During this delay, traders face preference uncertainty. In this context, we study optimal trading strategies and equilibrium prices in a continuous centralized market. We focus on liquidity shocks, during which preference uncertainty is likely to matter most. Preference uncertainty generates allocative ineff...
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作者:Fella, Giulio; Gallipoli, Giovanni
作者单位:University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of British Columbia
摘要:We compare two large-scale policy interventions aimed at reducing crime: subsidizing high school completion and increasing the length of prison sentences. To this purpose we use a life-cycle model with endogenous education and crime choices. We apply the model to property crime and calibrate it to U.S. data. We find that targeting crime reductions through increases in high school graduation rates entails large efficiency and welfare gains. These gains are absent if the same crime reduction is ...
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作者:Adhvaryu, Achyuta
作者单位:University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要:I study how the misallocation of new technology to individuals, who have low ex post returns to its use, affects learning and adoption behaviour. I focus on anti-malarial treatment, which is frequently over-prescribed in many low-income country contexts where diagnostic tests are inaccessible. I show that misdiagnosis reduces average therapeutic effectiveness, because only a fraction of adopters actually have malaria, and slows the rate of social learning due to increased noise. I use data on ...
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作者:Kahn, Lisa B.; Lange, Fabian
作者单位:Yale University; McGill University
摘要:Pay distributions fan out with experience. The leading explanations for this pattern are that over time, either employers learn about worker productivity but productivity remains fixed or workers' productivities themselves evolve heterogeneously. We propose a dynamic specification that nests both employer learning and dynamic productivity heterogeneity. We estimate this model on a 20-year panel of pay and performance measures from a single, large firm. The advantage of these data is that they ...
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作者:Mertens, Karel R. S. M.; Ravn, Morten O.
作者单位:Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of London; University College London
摘要:We study the effects of fiscal policy interventions in a liquidity trap in a model with nominal rigidities and an interest rate rule. In a liquidity trap caused by a self-fulfilling state of low confidence, higher government spending has deflationary effects that reduce the spending multiplier when the zero lower bound is binding. Instead, cuts in marginal labour tax rates are inflationary and become more expansionary when the zero lower bound is binding. These findings contradict a popular vi...
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作者:Jullien, Bruno; Park, In-Uck
作者单位:Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Bristol; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要:We show that sellers may earn a reputation for their ability to deliver high-quality goods on average by honestly announcing the realized quality of items for sale every period. As the expected revenue stream from continuing with honest communication increases with their ability, high-ability sellers remain honest while low-ability sellers find it too costly and sometimes lie about quality for short-term gain. Thus, cheap-talk communication facilitates the market's learning of a seller's abili...
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作者:Goyal, Sanjeev; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位:University of Cambridge; University of Oslo
摘要:Connections between individuals facilitate the exchange of goods, resources, and information and create benefits. These connections may be exploited by adversaries to spread their attacks as well. What is the optimal way to design and defend networks in the face of attacks? We develop a model with a Designer and an Adversary. The Designer moves first and chooses a network and an allocation of defence resources across nodes. The Adversary then allocates attack resources on nodes; if an attack s...
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作者:Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, Peter; Pycia, Marek; Rostek, Marzena; Weretka, Marek
作者单位:University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要:Auctions often involve the sale of many related goods: Treasury, spectrum, and electricity auctions are examples. In multi-unit auctions, bids for marginal units may affect payments for inframarginal units, giving rise to demand reduction and furthermore to incentives for shading bids differently across units. We establish that such differential bid shading results generically in ex post inefficient allocations in the uniform-price and pay-as-bid auctions. We also show that, in general, the ef...
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作者:Reguant, Mar
摘要:I extend multi-unit auction estimation techniques to a setting in which firms can express cost complementarities over time. In the context of electricity markets, I show how the auction structure and bidding data can be used to estimate these complementarities, which in these markets arise due to startup costs. I find that startup costs are substantial and that taking them into account helps better explain firm bidding strategies and production patterns. As in other dynamic settings, I find th...