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作者：Gayle, George-Levi; Miller, Robert A.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This article analyses the identification and empirical content of the pure moral hazard (PMH) and the hybrid moral hazard (HMH) principal-agent models. The PMH model has hidden actions, while the HMH model has hidden information in addition to hidden actions. In both models, agents are risk averse and principals are risk neutral. The article derives the equilibrium restrictions from the optimal contract and uses the restrictions to show that the models have empirical content. For any given ris...
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作者：Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study the mechanism design problem of guaranteeing desirable performances whenever agents are rational in the sense of not playing weakly dominated strategies. We first provide an upper bound for the best performance we can guarantee among all feasible mechanisms. The bound is represented as the maximized value of the designer's objective subject to the inequality version of the standard envelope incentive conditions. We then prove the bound to be tight under certain conditions on the desig...
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作者：Doepke, Matthias; Hazan, Moshe; Maoz, Yishay D.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Open University Israel
摘要：We argue that one major cause of the U.S. post-war baby boom was the rise in female labour supply during World War II. We develop a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous fertility and female labour force participation decisions. We use the model to assess the impact of the war on female labour supply and fertility in the decades following the war. For the war generation of women, the high demand for female labour brought about by mobilization leads to an increase in la...
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作者：Holmes, Thomas J.; McGrattan, Ellen R.; Prescott, Edward C.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：By the 1970s, quid pro quo policy, which requires multinational firms to transfer technology in return for market access, had become a common practice in many developing countries. While many countries have subsequently liberalized quid pro quo requirements, China continues to follow the policy. In this article, we incorporate quid pro quo policy into a multicountry dynamic general equilibrium model, using microevidence from Chinese patents to motivate key assumptions about the terms of the te...
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作者：Carapella, Francesca; Williamson, Stephen
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Washington University (WUSTL); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
摘要：Adynamic model with credit under limited commitment is constructed, in which limited memory can weaken the effects of punishment for default. This creates an endogenous role for government debt in credit markets, and the economy can be non-Ricardian. Default can occur in equilibrium, and government debt essentially plays a role as collateral and thus improves borrowers' incentives. The provision of government debt acts to discourage default, whether default occurs in equilibrium or not.
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J.
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This article studies an extension of the Baron-Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of...
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作者：Breon-Drish, Bradyn
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：I study a general class of noisy rational expectations models that nests the standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980) models, but relaxes the usual assumption of joint normality of asset pay-offs and supply, and allows for more general signal structures. I provide a constructive proof of existence of equilibrium, characterize the price function, and provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness within the class of equilibria with continuous price functions, which are met by both...
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作者：Dhaene, Geert; Jochmans, Koen
作者单位：KU Leuven; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：Maximum-likelihood estimation of nonlinear models with fixed effects is subject to the incidental-parameter problem. This typically implies that point estimates suffer from large bias and confidence intervals have poor coverage. This article presents a jackknife method to reduce this bias and to obtain confidence intervals that are correctly centred under rectangular-array asymptotics. The method is explicitly designed to handle dynamics in the data, and yields estimators that are straightforw...
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作者：Burkart, Mike; Lee, Samuel
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Swedish House of Finance; Swedish House of Finance; Swedish House of Finance; New York University; New York University
摘要：This article analyses how outsiders, such as bidders or activist investors, overcome the lack of coordination and information among dispersed shareholders. We identify the two basic means to achieve this goal. First, the outsider must relinquish private benefits in a manner that is informative about security benefits. We show under which conditions this is feasible and which acquisition strategies used in practice meet these conditions. Second, the outsider can alternatively use derivatives to...
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作者：Gottardi, Piero; Kubler, Felix
作者单位：European University Institute; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; University of Zurich; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)
摘要：In this article we examine the competitive equilibria of a dynamic stochastic economy with complete markets and collateral constraints. We show that, provided the sets of asset pay-offs and of collateral levels are sufficiently rich, the equilibrium allocations with sequential trades and collateral constraints are equivalent to those obtained in Arrow-Debreu markets subject to a series of limited pledgeability constraints. We provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria to b...
